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Pers Soc Psychol Rev 2009; 13; 3
DOI: 10.1177/1088868308326751

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://psr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/1/3
Commonality and the Complexity of “We”: Social Attitudes and Social Change

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The present article explores the complex role of collective identities in the development of intergroup biases and disparities, in interventions to improve orientations toward members of other groups, and in inhibiting or facilitating social action. The article revolves around the common ingroup identity model, examining general empirical support but also acknowledging potential limitations and emphasizing new insights and extensions. It proposes that the motivations of majority group members to preserve a system that advantages them and the motivations of minority group members to enhance their status have direct implications for preferred group representations and consequent intergroup relations. In particular, the effects of majority group members’ preferences for a common, one-group identity and minority group members’ preference for a dual identity (in which differences are acknowledged within the context of a superordinate identity) are considered in terms of intergroup attitudes, recognition of unfair disparities, and support for social action.

Keywords: acculturation; conflict resolution; common ingroup identity model; contact hypothesis; ingroup favoritism; intergroup relations; power; social categorization; social identity; status

The present article examines the fundamental and complex role of collective identity in the development and reinforcement of intergroup biases and disparities. The article revolves around the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), a theoretical framework for reducing intergroup biases and improving intergroup relations. We not only describe the model’s theoretical premises and general empirical support but also emphasize new insights and extensions of this line of research.

Initial empirical work on the common ingroup identity model was published 20 years ago (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989), and a formal presentation of the theoretical framework was published 15 years ago (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). The present piece is intended to illustrate the evolving nature of this framework and of research in intergroup bias in general and to show the depth and complexity of social biases. Although the article is structured around the common ingroup identity model, critiques, and related developments, we attempt to provide a broad review of the literature, drawing on others’ research and theory. Moreover, this article is based on the 2008 presidential address for the Society for Personality and Social Psychology by the first author, but it is a co-authored piece. The ideas herein represent the original insights of Samuel L. Gaertner and the new directions initiated by Tamar Saguy. It also illustrates the continuity of the collaboration and the cumulative

Authors’ Note: This article is based on a presidential address delivered by John Dovidio at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology meetings in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in February 2008. Preparation of this work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. BCS-0613218, awarded to the first and second authors. Please address correspondence to John F. Dovidio, Department of Psychology, Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, PO Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520; e-mail: john.dovidio@yale.edu.

PSPR, Vol. 13 No. 1, February 2009 3-20
DOI: 10.1177/1088868308326751
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nature of scientific inquiry. Sam Gaertner was my doctoral advisor, and I (Dovidio) served as Tamar Saguy’s dissertation advisor. For the present article, we describe, in the next two brief sections, the general historical and conceptual landscape, which provides a context for the model. We then summarize the common ingroup identity model and its empirical support. In the remaining sections, we consider critiques and limitations of the model. We emphasize the potentially divergent preferences of members of majority and minority groups for different forms of group representations and the consequences of these group preferences for the content of intergroup interactions and, ultimately, for social change toward equality. We explore the complex consequences of common identity, including a potential “darker side of we” for minority group members (see also Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007).

**HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERGROUP BIAS**

The study of prejudice and stereotyping and of ways to reduce intergroup biases has a long history in social psychology. In addition, perspectives on the phenomena have systematically evolved over the years (Dovidio, 2001; Duckitt, 1992). Beginning in the 1920s and into the 1930s, as racial prejudice and bias came to be recognized more generally in U.S. society as being unfair, prejudice and stereotyping were conceived of as irrational processes. In the later 1930s through the 1950s, as stimulated politically by the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany and intellectually by the classic work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), prejudice and other forms of bias were seen not as simple disruptions in rational processes but as dangerous aberrations from normal thinking. The research emphasized prejudice as an abnormal manifestation of unconscious psychological defense mechanisms and the expression of pathological needs.

However, in the late 1950s and into the 1960s—a decade characterized by recognition of the widespread existence of bias (institutional as well as personal), great civil unrest in the United States, and the successful passage of civil rights legislation—a significant shift in psychological perspective on bias occurred (Duckitt, 1992). Social psychologists began to recognize the role of normal processes (e.g., social categorization; Allport, 1954) in the development and maintenance of intergroup biases. By the 1960s, psychologists focused on the role of social learning and norms in the development and maintenance of racial biases (e.g., Pettigrew, 1958). The emergence of social cognitive work in the 1970s fueled the study of the normality of bias. Intergroup biases represented the by-products of normal, typically functional processes by which people, as cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), process, store, and retrieve information in expedient ways. Whereas the social–cognitive revolution led many social psychologists to focus on micro-level processes, the perspective was further expanded in Europe by the emphasis on the substantial influence of collective identity and motivations in intergroup biases, as led by the classic work of Tajfel and his colleagues (e.g., Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) on social identity theory. Rather than simply consider bias as a by-product, social identity theory viewed intergroup bias as a central process by which people establish the positive distinctiveness of their group and derive personal esteem.

Both social–cognitive and social identity approaches, which continue to dominate the study of prejudice and stereotyping, reinforce the perspective that intergroup bias is rooted in normal, functional psychological processes. They converge on the central role of social categorization in bias. Social categorization primarily involves the perception of a person in terms of his or her group membership rather than with respect to their individual, unique characteristics. Viewing a person as a member of a group has profound consequences on how people process information about others, feel about others, and act toward others (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). Also, evidence of bias in the minimal intergroup paradigm reinforced the emerging conception of prejudice as a normal process (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1969). According to this paradigm, the assignment of people to groups (assignments often based on arbitrary criteria) was sufficient to produce prejudices both in favor of members of one’s own group and sometimes against members of another group.

**SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND SOCIAL BIAS**

Social categorization and associated psychological processes play a critical role in the formation and perpetuation of intergroup biases; thus, they are important elements of strategies to reduce or eliminate these biases. One important aspect of the social categorization process, even when the basis for the categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups is quite trivial (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), involves a distinction between the group containing the self (the ingroup) and other groups (the outgroups)—between the “we’s” and the “they’s” (see social identity theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; self-categorization theory, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

When collective identity is salient, the distinction between ingroup and outgroup members as a consequence of social categorization has a profound influence
on social perception, affect, cognition, and behavior. Perceptually, when people categorize other people (or objects) into groups, they tend to minimize the differences between members of the same category (Tajfel, 1969), often ignoring such differences when making decisions or forming impressions, whereas they tend to exaggerate differences between groups (Turner, 1985). Cognitively, people have better memory for information about ways in which ingroup members are similar to the self and outgroup members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder, 1981); they remember more positive information about ingroup members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980) and see greater connection between other members of the ingroup and the self (Aron et al., 2005); and they expect ingroup members to share one’s attitudes and values more so than do outgroup members (Robbins & Krueger, 2005).

These processes all directly contribute to the pervasive biases that people have for ingroup members over outgroup members. Emotionally, people spontaneously experience more positive affect toward other members of the ingroup than they do toward members of the outgroup (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), and they perceive ingroup members to be more trustworthy (Voci, 2006). Thinking about people in terms of ingroup pronouns (“we” and “us”) over outgroup pronouns (“they” and “them”) spontaneously activates more positive associations; in fact, simply associating stimuli with “we” leads to more favorable evaluations of those stimuli than without and when paired with “they” (Perdue, Dovidio, Gutman, & Tyler, 1990). Also, inducing people to refer to others as “we” rather as “them” or “you and I” creates more positive impressions of others (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993). In terms of behavioral outcomes, people are more helpful toward ingroup members than toward outgroup members (Dovidio et al., 1997). When ingroup/outgroup social categorizations are salient and personal identities are not, people tend to behave in a more greedy and less trustworthy way toward members of other groups than if they were reacting to each other as individuals (Insko et al., 2001). Consistent with the notion that these psychological processes are fundamentally normal, biases favoring ingroup over outgroup members, even on the basis of superficial social categorization, are greater among people higher in self-esteem (Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987).

Social categorization is a dynamic process, however, and people possess many group identities and are capable of focusing on different social categories. By modifying a perceiver’s goals, perceptions of past experiences, and expectations, one has the opportunity to alter the level of category inclusiveness that will be primary or most influential in a given situation. This malleability of the level at which impressions are formed is important because of its implications for altering the way that people think about members of ingroups and outgroups and, consequently, the nature of intergroup relations. Attempts to combat these biases can therefore be directed at altering the nature of social categorization.

**COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL**

Because categorization into social groups is a basic process fundamental to intergroup bias, social psychologists have targeted it as a starting point for improving intergroup relations. A variety of approaches have been successfully employed. For example, decategorization strategies that emphasize the individual qualities of others (Wilder, 1981) and encourage personalized interactions (Miller, 2002) have been used to decrease the salience of social categories and associated identities.

The approach that we have employed, the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), draws on the theoretical foundations of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). This strategy emphasizes the process of recategorization whereby members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves as a single, more inclusive superordinate group rather than as two completely separate groups. With recategorization, as proposed by the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), the goal is to reduce bias by systematically altering the perception of intergroup boundaries, redefining who is conceived of as an ingroup member. If members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves as a single, more inclusive superordinate group, rather than as two completely separate groups, attitudes toward former outgroup members would be expected to become more positive through processes involving pro ingroup bias, thereby reducing intergroup bias. That is, the processes that lead to favoritism toward ingroup members would now be directed toward former outgroup members (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

The value of creating a one-group representation for reducing intergroup bias has been consistently supported by research. Laboratory studies have demonstrated that diverse interventions that produce more inclusive representations of different groups systematically reduce intergroup bias—for example, cooperation (Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990), perceptual similarity (e.g., proximity and visual similarity (Gaertner et al., 1989), and positive affect (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Loux, 2000). These results have been replicated in different cultures (in Portugal, e.g.; Rebelo, Guerra, & Monteiro, 2004).

Field studies in a range of settings (e.g., high schools, banking mergers, and blended families; see Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001) and antibias
intervention programs with children (Houlette et al., 2004) consistently show that stronger perceptions of a common, one-group identity predict more positive intergroup attitudes, thus supporting the external validity of the model. In addition, creating a common ingroup identity has been found to increase positive forms of behavior, such as self-disclosure and helping across original group lines (Dovidio et al., 1997; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001), support for cooperative intergroup policies (Beaton, Dovidio, & Léger, 2008), and intergroup forgiveness (e.g., that by Jews toward Germans for the Holocaust; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Moreover, the common ingroup identity model has been applied as an integrative theoretical framework to explain how intergroup contact, along the lines outlined in the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), psychologically operates to reduce bias and improve intergroup relations (Dovidio, Gaertner, Saguy, & Halabi, 2008; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996).

LIMITATIONS OF COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL

In general, research relevant to the common ingroup identity model demonstrates that once one-group representations are achieved through interventions, they consistently relate to more positive feelings and attitudes toward others who were previously seen in terms of an outgroup membership (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). However, as we have previously noted (and appropriately so), attempts to create a common identity may produce superordinate identities that are unstable; they may also produce identities that are unsuccessful and that actually exacerbate bias.

The first type of critique emphasizes that a sense of superordinate identity, if successfully established, is difficult to sustain. Practically, the impact of a newly established common identity may pale beside naturalistic influences that reinforce the original intergroup distinctions and their social importance. As Hewstone (1996) proposed, interventions to create a sense of common group identity are unlikely to be sufficiently potent to “overcome powerful ethnic and racial categorizations on a more than temporary basis” (p. 351; see also Pettigrew, 1998). Theoretically, Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory (1991) proposes that people have competing motives for assimilation and differentiation that lead them to prefer membership in smaller groups, which provide a balance between these motives. Singular inclusive identities may threaten members’ fundamental need for distinctiveness, a need for feeling unique and differentiated from others. In response to such a threat, distinctive subgroup identities may tend to reemerge over time. Nevertheless, even when social and psychological forces produce a deterioration of common group identity and a reinstatement of original separate group boundaries, the initial establishment of a superordinate identity can have lingering benefit. The earlier experience of a common group identity can facilitate the perception of a common identity in response to new, subsequent interventions designed to promote shared identity and connection between the groups (Gaertner, Dovidio, Mann, & Anastasio, 1988).

The second critique suggests that efforts to induce a common identity may be met with resistance that can increase bias between members of the original groups. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes that people are motivated to maintain the positive distinctiveness of their group relative to other groups. When the integrity of one’s group identity is threatened, people become motivated to reestablish positive and distinctive group identities and thereby maintain relatively high levels of intergroup bias (R. J. Brown & Wade, 1987) or show increased levels of bias (Deschamps & Brown, 1983).

Consistent with this reasoning, interventions that emphasize similarity or overlapping boundaries between groups (Dovidio et al., 1997; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997) or shared identity (Horney & Hogg, 2000) can exacerbate intergroup bias as a way of reaffirming positive distinctiveness. For instance, Horney and Hogg (2000) found that a condition that emphasized students’ common university membership produced even higher levels of bias between humanities and math–science students than did a condition that emphasized their separate group identities (see also Crisp, Walsh, & Hewstone, 2006). This effect is likely to occur among people who highly value their original group, such as those more identified with their original group (Crisp et al., 2006), and when the initiative to form a superordinate identity is perceived to come from an outgroup member than from an ingroup member (Gómez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner, & Cuadrado, 2008).

These findings, along with other theoretical developments in the field, including research on the mutual intergroup differentiation model (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; see also R. Brown & Hewstone, 2005) led us to consider an alternative form of recategorization, a dual identity, which we had initially identified (see Gaertner et al., 1989). The mutual intergroup differentiation model recommends that intergroup contact represent cooperative interactions in which the original ingroup/outgroup categorizations are recognized and not degraded, as with common-group representation. By recognizing the different groups’ assets and weaknesses and by valuing the complementarity of group resources within the context, groups can maintain positive distinctiveness within a cooperative framework.
Within the framework of the common ingroup identity model, we explored the potential role of the development of a second form of recategorization, a dual identity, on intergroup relations. A dual identity involves the simultaneous activation of original subgroup identities (e.g., Catholics and Protestants) and a common ingroup identity (e.g., Christians). Functional relationships (e.g., intergroup cooperation, as outlined in the mutual intergroup differentiation model) may be instrumental in creating a dual identity (González & Brown, 2003, 2006), but even in the absence of direct interdependence, a dual-identity representation can be elicited by simultaneously emphasizing common affiliation and subgroup identities (Dovidio, Gaertner, Pearson, & Riek, 2005).

We have proposed that a dual-identity form of recategorization is relevant to contexts in which group identities and associated cultural values are central to members’ functioning or in which identities are associated with highly visible cues. Under these conditions, it would be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish these group identities or, as perceivers, to be “color-blind.” Recognition of original group identities within an overriding superordinate identity can ameliorate identity threat that can otherwise exacerbate intergroup bias.

Consistent with our hypothesis that a dual identity represents a viable alternative form of recategorization, survey studies reveal that racial and ethnic minority group members who describe themselves in terms of a dual identity (e.g., Korean American) have more positive attitudes toward other racial and ethnic groups than do those who define themselves in terms of their subgroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1996). In addition, experimental interventions to induce different representations of groups have demonstrated that creating a dual identity can be just as effective as a one-group identity for reducing bias toward outgroup members present in the contact situation (González & Brown, 2003). Moreover, emphasizing dual identity can be even more effective than facilitating a one-group representation for improving attitudes toward the outgroup, beyond the specific intergroup contact situation, because the association between present outgroup members and the outgroup as a whole is maintained (González & Brown, 2003, 2006). However, when subgroups are recategorized within superordinate identity, they tend to show greater bias toward groups not included within that common ingroup identity (Davies, Steele, & Markus, 2008; Kessler & Mummendey, 2001).

We note, however, that in contrast to the consistently positive relationship between the experience of a common identity (i.e., a one-group representation) and more favorable intergroup orientations, the strength of a dual identity can have divergent effects associated with either positive or negative intergroup responses. For instance, in studies of banking executives who were involved in a merger and of members of blended families, a stronger sense of a dual identity was related to greater bias and conflict (see Gaertner et al., 2001).

One explanation for this latter effect is that when a common identity is made salient for members of different groups, members of one group or both groups may begin to regard their subgroup’s characteristics (e.g., norms, values, and goals) as being more prototypical of the common inclusive category when compared to those of the other subgroup (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). When this occurs, the outgroup is judged as being substandard, deviant, or inferior, thereby leading to greater bias between the subgroups (e.g., Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004). This type of group projection that exacerbates bias may be more likely to occur when the superordinate identity represents a dimension directly relevant to the subcategory identities (e.g., Germans for East Germans and West Germans); when the superordinate identity is irrelevant to the subgroup identities, the experience of a dual identity is likely to have more favorable intergroup consequences (Hall & Crisp, 2005; see also Dovidio et al., 2007).

While continuing to recognize the many potential benefits of establishing a common group identity and while acknowledging these critiques and potential boundary conditions, in the remainder of this article we consider another perspective on the social impact of a common group identity. In particular, we caution about another potential “dark side of we.”

**COMMONALITY, DIFFERENCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

As proposed by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and as noted earlier, people derive personal esteem from their membership in groups and thus strive to establish the positive distinctiveness of their group relative to other groups. People who identify more strongly with their group are more motivated to maintain their group’s positive distinctiveness (Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001; Simon, Kulla, & Zobel, 1995). Furthermore, the motivations for positive group distinctiveness are manifested in fundamentally different ways by members of majority groups (high status or high power) and minority groups (low status or low power). Members of high-status groups are motivated to protect their collective identity, whereas members of low-status groups are motivated to enhance the collective identity of their group (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006).

This basic proposition about the orientations of majority and minority group members toward the status quo is
consistent with other intergroup frameworks. Blumer (1958) posited that members of dominant groups have a basic motivation to maintain their relatively advantaged position in society. According to the group position framework, once members of dominant groups feel a threat to their group's power, they become motivated to defend their status and remove the threat. Conversely, members of disadvantaged groups become motivated to change the status quo to improve their group's position. Similarly, realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) posits that group members are driven by their desire to possess and maintain control over valued resources. Therefore, the lower-power group will compete to gain resources and status, whereas the higher-power group will act against any threat to their resources.

The efforts of members of majority groups to maintain the status quo and their structural advantage may, on occasion, take extreme and blatant forms, in terms of violence and overt discrimination (e.g., apartheid), but in societies in which norms of fairness dominate, biases that reinforce the majority group's advantaged status typically occur indirectly (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008; Scheepers et al., 2006). Intergroup bias is generally expressed in subtle rather than blatant terms and not always in full consciousness. This bias can be masked so that it appears to reflect benevolence (Jackman, 1994; Nadler, 2002). In public discourse, efforts are commonly made to distract attention away from group-based disparities (Bowskill, Lyons, & Coyle, 2007; Ruscher, 2001; van Dijk, 1993) and justify the system of inequality (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). These processes typically reinforce the status quo without provoking lower-status minority group members.

Although in some cases minority group members may endorse system-justifying ideologies, they typically become motivated to improve their group's social position and enhance its status (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999). Work from the social identity perspective demonstrates that members of minority groups value the distinctive qualities of their group, beyond those that define the status relationship, more so than do majority group members (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), particularly when the former perceive the disparities between the groups as being illegitimate and the group boundaries as being impermeable (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001). Consequently, members of minority groups tend to identify with their group more strongly than do majority group members (Simon & Brown, 1987). Also, minority group members who are more strongly identified with their group are more strongly motivated to enhance their group's status (Saguy et al., 2008, Study 2).

We propose that (a) the motivations of majority group members to preserve a system that advantages them and (b) the motivations of minority group members to enhance their status, both collectively (i.e., social action) and individually (i.e., individual mobility), have direct implications for preferred group representations and consequent intergroup behavior. In particular, majority group members are likely to strongly endorse a one-group representation and recategorization as a single group because they see the qualities of the superordinate group as representing (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004) and promoting their group's dominant values and characteristics. When a one-group representation dominates, differences and disparities between the separate groups—the majority and minority group—become less salient. Distinctions are ignored and disparities between the groups are obscured by a focus on commonality. Moreover, in the absence of acknowledging subgroup differences, a single standard for assessing merit may be applied to all members of the superordinate group, but the nature of this standard favors members of the original majority subgroup (Wenzel, 2000). Consequently, members of advantaged groups, who would be likely to support practices promoting social change if they perceived their advantaged position as being illegitimate (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003), may be less likely to endorse these initiatives when group-based disparities are masked by a focus on superordinate group identity and commonality.

In addition, an adoption of a one-group orientation by minority group members could further sustain the status quo by relaxing minority group members’ motivation for change through collective action (Wright, 2001). From the perspective of minority groups, two key elements for collective action to occur are salient group identity and perception of the status difference between the minority and majority group as being illegitimate (Ellemers & Barreto, 2001; Wright, 2001). Thus, if minority group members adopt a one-group perspective at the expense of their previous group identity, they may attend less to group-based disparities, and when they do consider disparities, they may perceive them as being more legitimate (Huo, 2003; Huo, Smith, & Tyler, 1996). As such, reducing the salience of separate group identities tends to increase the likelihood that minority group members adopt system-justifying ideologies and support the social system (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Thus, replacing different group identities with only a common ingroup identity can both reduce the salience of subgroup distinctions and increase perceptions of the legitimacy of disparities. Together, these processes can undermine minorities’ motivation to initiate action to challenge the status quo and thus further contribute to the stability of social structure (Doosje,
Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Wright, 2001; Wright, Kiu, Semenya, & Comeau, 2008).

However, we hypothesize that minority group members will prefer a dual identity to a superordinate one-group identity, which requires them to abandon their subgroup identity and which threatens their group’s positive distinctiveness. In mergers involving high- and low-status groups, for example, members of low-status groups perceive less common group identity with the merged entity than do members of majority groups (P. Fischer, Greitemeyer, Omay, & Frey, 2007); they have less favorable expectations of the merger; and they are generally more suspicious that their group will not be adequately represented in the merged organization (Mottola, 1996).

The advantage of a dual identity for minority group members is that it affirms the distinctiveness of their subgroup identity but in a context of connection and potential cooperation with the majority group (R. Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Shared group identity provides common ground for intergroup interaction and exchange. In addition, whereas people often fail to extend their principles or morality and justice to members of other groups, the common group component of a dual identity helps to establish a context of moral inclusion (Opotow, 1995). Huo (2003), for instance, found that for members of both majority and minority groups (i.e., Whites, Latinos, and Blacks), stronger identification with the superordinate group “Americans,” even when subgroup identity was strong, predicted greater sensitivity to general principles of just treatment within the group. Thus, when dual identity is salient, group-based inequity and injustice are more likely to be recognized by majority group members and responded to as moral violations (Dovidio et al., 2004), which can motivate the majority group toward action for equality (Tyler & Blader, 2003). Smith and Tyler (1996) demonstrated that majority group members (Whites) who had a strong superordinate identity (American) showed relatively strong support for policies designed to reduce inequities between Blacks and Whites (e.g., affirmative action).

Common identity (a one-group representation) can also facilitate justice concerns for individuals who were formerly viewed as outgroup members but are now identified solely as members of a superordinate group. Creating common identity, for instance, can enhance perceptions of the humanity of these individuals (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007) and an appreciation of their unique personal qualities (Dovidio et al., 1997). However, because the associative link to other members of the outgroup are severed when subgroup identities are not acknowledged, a one-group representation, a dual identity, is less likely to promote equity between the groups or produce generalization of these benefits to other members of the group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

In the remainder of this section, we review relevant literature and recent findings demonstrating not only that majority and minority group members have these different representation preferences but also that these different perspectives have important functional implications.

Majority and Minority Group Differences in Identity Preferences

Consistent with the hypothesis that groups varying in status and power prefer different group representations, research has revealed that majority and minority group members have different preferences for the ultimate outcomes of intergroup relations. Whereas majority group members favor the assimilation of minority groups into one single culture (a traditional “melting pot” orientation) or the dominant culture (Horenczyk, 1996), minority group members tend to want to retain their cultural identity but typically in positive connection with other groups in the larger culture. Berry (1997) presents four forms of cultural relations in pluralistic societies via the intersection of yes/no responses to two relevant questions: First, are cultural identity and customs of value to be retained? Second, are positive relations with the larger society of value and to be sought? These combinations reflect four adaptation strategies for intergroup relations: integration, when cultural identities are retained and positive relations with the larger society are sought; separatism, when cultural identities are retained but positive relations with the larger society are not sought; assimilation, when cultural identities are abandoned and positive relations with the larger society are desired; and marginalization, when cultural identities are abandoned and are not replaced by positive identification with the larger society.

Although this framework has been applied to the ways in which immigrants acclimate to a new society (van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998), we propose that it can be adapted to apply to intergroup relations between majority and minority groups in general (see also Hewstone, Turner, Kenworthy, & Crisp, 2006). As illustrated in Figure 1, by substituting the separate strengths of the subgroup identity and subordinate group identity for the answers to Berry’s two questions (1997), the combinations map onto the four representations considered in the common ingroup identity model: different groups (subgroup identity is high and superordinate identity is low, as in separatism), dual identity (subgroup and superordinate group identities are high, as is integration), one group (subgroup identity is low and superordinate group identity is high, as in assimilation), and separate individuals (subgroup and superordinate group identities are low, as in marginalization).
We note, however, that the separate-individuals representation, within the framework of the common ingroup identity model, can have other meanings, such as an individualistic orientation (Wilder, 1981), and can relate to another form of color-blind assimilation based on individual qualities (e.g., meritocracy; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Two of the acculturation ideologies that have received the most attention are assimilation and integration (multiculturalism). These two ideologies have often been considered oppositional (Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). Assimilation requires minority group members to conform to dominant values and ideals to achieve full citizenship and be accepted in society, thereby often necessitating the abandonment of racial or ethnic group values. In contrast, multicultural integration strives to be inclusive by recognizing and often celebrating intergroup differences and their contributions to a common society (Frederickson, 1999; Verkuyten, 2006).

Research in the area of immigration suggests that immigrant groups and majority (host-country) groups have different preferences for assimilation and multicultural integration. Van Oudenhoven et al. (1998) found that in the Netherlands Dutch majority group members preferred an assimilation of minority groups (i.e., minority group identity was abandoned and replaced by identification with the dominant Dutch culture), whereas Turkish and Moroccan immigrants most strongly endorsed integration (i.e., they would retain their cultural identities while valuing the dominant Dutch culture). Verkuyten (2006) summarized the results of eight studies of adolescents and young adults in Europe, consistently finding that minority group members supported multiculturalism (integration) more so than majority group members did. These preferences also apply to the preferences of Whites and racial and ethnic minorities. In the United States in particular, Whites most prefer assimilation, whereas racial and ethnic minorities favor pluralistic integration (Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). These orientations translate directly into stronger preferences for one-group representations for Whites and dual-identity representations for Blacks, particularly among those more highly identified with their group (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000).

**Responses to Different Representations**

We propose that the different representations endorsed by majority and minority group members are more than mere preferences: They reflect different strategies associated with motivations to maintain the status quo (for majority group members) and alter the status quo (for minority group members). That is, these are functional orientations. This tenet has a range of implications, which we consider in this section.

To the extent that the different preferred representations of majority and minority group members have group-serving functions, group members would be expected to respond relatively favorably in contexts that reinforce their group’s preference and to react negatively in contexts that promote the other group’s preferred representation. Consistent with this proposition, our previous work (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000) revealed that majority group (i.e., White) college students had more positive intergroup attitudes and greater commitment to the university the more that they perceived relations in the institution as reflecting a one-group representation. In contrast, racial and ethnic minority group students showed more favorable intergroup attitudes and greater institutional commitment the more that they felt conditions promoted a dual-identity representation. These divergent responses were more pronounced among majority and minority group members who were more strongly identified with their group. Huo and Molina (2006) found that feelings of subgroup respect predicted positive affect toward America and trust in the justice system more among Blacks and Latinos than among Whites, whose orientations were more strongly predicted by their feelings of personal respect within a common identity (American).

With respect to responses to members of other groups, there is converging evidence that people respond more...
positively to others who express a group representation that matches their own, when compared to an alternative representation. Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, and Johnson (in press) found that White students, who generally prefer a one-group representation and assimilation, responded more positively (i.e., with more empathy and helpfulness) to a Black person who identified himself solely in terms of common university membership rather than solely in terms of a different racial group identity (i.e., as Black) or a dual identity (i.e., a Black university student). In field research, Blacks were helped significantly more often when they wore college-signature clothing representing common university identity with White participants (i.e., implying an effort to emphasize subordinate identity) than when they did not (Nier et al., 2001). Across six experiments, Kaiser and Pratt-Hyatt (in press) showed that Whites evaluated Blacks less positively when they expressed higher levels of racial identity.

In contrast, González and Brown (2006, Study 2) demonstrated that viewing the groups in terms of a dual identity was more effective for promoting generalization of the benefits of intergroup contact for members of minority laboratory groups, whose status was defined by their smaller numerical representation. Also, Blacks with higher levels of racial identification are more resistant to cultural assimilation that fails to recognize their group’s distinctive characteristics and contributions (Worrell & Gardner-Kitt, 2006).

Within the acculturation literature is the work of Piontkowski, Rohmann, and Florack (2002), who found that discordance in acculturation values between majority and minority groups was directly related to feelings of intergroup threat (see also Bourhis, Moïse, & Perrault, 1997). Furthermore, in a laboratory analog study in which preference for a one-group identity or dual identity was experimentally induced, Scheepers, Saguy, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2008) demonstrated that responses were more positive to members of other groups who shared participants’ representations of the groups (one group or dual identity) than to members who endorsed the other representation. Moreover, when encountering a member of the other group who had a different representation, participants showed a physiological threat response. Taken together, these findings point to the critical importance of seeing others as sharing one’s intergroup representations for evaluations and behavior.

Establishing and Reestablishing Preferred Representations

Another implication of the hypothesized strategic function of majority and minority group members’ preferred representations is that majority and minority group members will attempt to steer intergroup discourse in different ways. As such, our hypothesis is that whereas majority group members would prefer discourse that focuses virtually exclusively on commonality, minority group members would be more balanced in their preference to discuss group differences and commonalities (Saguy et al., 2008).

In a pair of studies, one with laboratory groups and the other with ethnic groups varying in status in Israel (Ashkenazim, high status; Mizrahi, low status), Saguy et al. (2008) provided evidence in support of this hypothesis. In the laboratory study, group position was manipulated by giving one group control over valued resources (experimental credit) for both groups. As they approached intergroup contact, both groups showed an equivalent interest in discussing topics of commonality. However, high-power group members exhibited significantly less interest than did low-power group members in discussing power differences between the groups, whereas low-power group members displayed equivalent interest in talking about commonality and difference. Moreover, the effect of group power position on desire to talk about differences between the groups was mediated by motivation for changing group positions toward equality. That is, low-power group members’ greater preference, relative to that of high-power group members, to discuss points of difference occurred because they had a greater motivation for a change in the power structure.

Saguy et al. (2008) also obtained this pattern of preference to discuss commonality and difference with members of real groups differing in social status and power in Israel and so replicated the mediating effect of motivation for social change on interest in talking about group differences. In addition, members of the high-status group (Ashkenazim) who were more highly identified with their group displayed greater interest in talking about commonality, whereas members of the low-status group (Mizrahi) who were more highly identified with their group showed a greater preference to talk about differences. In general, these studies converge to reveal that hierarchical relations between groups systematically lead to different preferences and strategies for members of majority and minority groups. Members of majority groups, who are motivated to maintain the status quo, show a preference for focusing on commonalities to the exclusion of differences. Members of minority groups who desire to alter the status quo to improve their subgroup’s position exhibit a greater desire to talk about differences between the groups but at the same time also discuss commonalities between the groups.

Another implication of our proposition concerning the strategic functions of the preferred one-group intergroup representation for majority group members and the dual identity for minority group members is that when the
status quo becomes unstable, the group-based preferences for certain forms of intergroup relations will intensify. Exploring this possibility, we examined students’ preferences for university assimilationist (one-group) policies, multicultural (dual-identity) policies, and separatist (two-group) policies, longitudinally, three times over an academic year (Dovidio & Kafati, 2003). The first time was at the beginning of the semester, when race relations were perceived to be relatively positive and stable. The second time was near the end of the first semester after a series of racial incidents threatening Blacks (e.g., racial graffiti on campus, several alleged episodes of verbal harassment of Black students). The third time was in the middle of the second semester, when race relations were perceived to be less tense and volatile.

Even before the racial incidents occurred, majority and minority students showed differential support for one-group, dual-identity, and separate-group policies. Consistent with the findings reported earlier, Whites exhibited a stronger preference for one-group policies than did minority group students, and minority students showed a stronger preference for dual-identity policies. For both Whites and minorities, separatist policies were least supported, and there were no differences between the groups in level of support. During the second measurement period, when racial tensions were high, these racial differences in support for one group and dual-identity policies were significantly magnified. In addition, Blacks more strongly supported separatist policies than did Whites and at a level somewhat higher than their support for one-group initiatives. Previous research has shown that when personal mobility is limited, when group identity is salient and threatened, when the situation is perceived as being unfair, and when people believe that their group is efficacious (Sears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), minority group members respond with strategies of resistance and competition, including separatism. Nevertheless, we note that in this situation of intergroup relations within the same university, even when racial tensions were high, Black students preferred dual-identity policies over separatist policies. By the third assessment period, when racial tensions had substantially subsided, the pattern of policy preferences approached what it was at the beginning of the year. Whether the different policy-related responses of majority and minority students were conscious strategies or unconscious reactions to the events is unclear from these data. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is consistent with our hypothesized difference in the goals of the groups.

Consequences of Focusing on Commonality

While acknowledging the demonstrated value of creating a common identity for improving attitudes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), fostering more personalized and intimate interaction (Dovidio et al., 1997), and promoting prosocial behavior across group lines (Nier et al., 2001), we acknowledge that a focus on commonality can distract attention away from group disparity and inequity, thereby reinforcing the status quo that advantages the majority group. Even apparently positive forms of action, such as helping, can be strategically executed to maintain status differences between groups and promote the dependency of the disadvantaged group (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006).

Dixon, Durheim, and Tredoux (2005, 2007) have questioned the focus of much of the work of traditional social psychology on intergroup attitudes as the ultimate measure of positive intergroup relations without adequate attention to the impact of attitudes on actual structural change toward equality. Dixon et al. (2007) “accept that contact may transform interpersonal attitudes and stereotypes, but caution that it may leave unaltered the ideological beliefs that sustain systems of racial discrimination” (p. 868; see also Jackman & Crane, 1986). They further argue that “it is possible that the emotional benefits of contact may be offset by its tendency to promote acceptance of broader patterns of discrimination” (Dixon et al., 2005, p. 707). In support of this proposition, they document a general principle–implementation gap between majority group members’ widespread endorsement of equality in principle and weaker and less consistent support for policies for creating concrete social change between the groups in society (Dixon et al., 2005, 2007; Durheim & Dixon, 2004; see also Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996). This position dovetails with our hypothesis that when original group boundaries are degraded and replaced by a superordinate identity, majority group members are likely to respond more positively to an individual originally viewed as a member of another group, but they may be less likely to extend support to the other group as an entity. Thus, individual mobility may be facilitated but without a change in social structure or collective status between the groups.

From this perspective, if positive contact (or an emphasis on common identity) reduces attention to structural inequality as it promotes positive attitudes toward members of the outgroup, it can have consequences for group members’ expectations regarding intergroup relations and hierarchy. Specifically, such outcomes may inflate perceptions of the fairness of the majority group among minority group members and thus produce optimism about prospects of equality and so relax their motivation to take direct action for social change. In a survey study of Black and White respondents in South Africa, Dixon et al. (2007) found that more positive intergroup contact, which has been demonstrated to facilitate the development of a common ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1996), was
associated with Black South Africans’ decreased support for social policies that could promote racial equality. Black South Africans who reported more positive contact with Whites were less supportive of compensatory policies promoting the interests of Blacks in education and employment.

A key factor in mobilizing members of oppressed groups to act for social change lies in recognizing that intergroup inequality exists and that one’s group is disadvantaged within the social system (van Zomeren et al., 2008). For example, among Black Americans, perceptions that group boundaries are permeable (i.e., it is possible to attain high social status regardless of group membership) reduce Blacks’ support for collective action (Wright & Lubensky, in press; see also Reicher, 2007). In addition, lack of attention to group inequity, which is obscured when people think only in terms of common identity, can undermine majority group members’ willingness to engage in action for social change toward group equality (Dixon et al., 2005), which can be fueled by perceptions of unfairness or illegitimate majority group advantage (Saguy et al., 2008).

Direct empirical evidence is only recently emerging in support of the proposition that an emphasis on commonality and common identity may not necessary translate into action for social change and, at least under some conditions, can undermine momentum for change. However, some recent findings are supportive. In particular, Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, and Pratto (in press) conducted two studies that explored these implications. The first study experimentally examined the causal effect of a commonality-focused encounter, relative to a difference-focused interaction, on low-power group members’ outgroup attitudes, attention to inequality, and expectations of outgroup fairness, as well as on high-power group members’ intergroup orientations and resource allocation. The second study generalized and extended the findings with respect to minority groups by examining the relation of positive intergroup contact to attitudes, perceptions of the inequality and outgroup fairness, and support for social change in a naturalistic intergroup context.

The laboratory study (Saguy et al., in press, Study 1) manipulated power between two randomly assigned groups (as in Saguy et al., 2008) by giving the high-power group the position of assigning extra course credits to the two groups. Before the high-power group members allocated the credits, members of both groups interacted with instructions to focus on either intergroup commonalities or differences. As expected, commonality-focused interaction produced more positive intergroup attitudes for both high-power and low-power group members than did differences-focused contact. In addition, for both groups, attention to inequality between groups was lower in the commonality-focused condition. Moreover, members of the low-power group expected the high-power group to be fairer in allocating the resources and to distribute the credits in a more equitable fashion following commonality-focused interaction than differences-focused interaction. These effects were mediated by more positive intergroup attitudes and decreased attention to inequity during the interaction.

However, when the low-power group members’ expectations were compared to the high-power group’s actual allocation, there was a significant discrepancy (see Figure 2). As the low-power groups anticipated, the high-power groups were substantially biased against the low-power group in the allocation of credits after differences-focused contact; but, unexpectedly, from the perspective of low-power group members, high-power groups were just as biased in allocating the credits after commonality-focused interaction. The more positive intergroup attitudes of high-power group members in the commonality-focused condition than in the differences-focused condition did not translate into more material support to achieve equality, and the high-power groups’ allocation fell significantly below what low-power groups anticipated.

Although the experimental nature of this study permitted causal analysis, the intergroup relations were situation based and short-lived and therefore might not reflect processes that occur in more naturalistic intergroup contexts. For instance, members of disadvantaged groups might initially be overly optimistic regarding outgroup fairness but not show the same effect with repeated intergroup experiences. A second study (Saguy et al., in press) thus focused on the responses of group members in a naturalistic context, Arabs in Israel, a national minority shown to suffer enduring disadvantage as compared to that of Jews (e.g., in academic achievement, income, political power; Smooha, 2003).

In this study, Saguy et al. (in press) surveyed Arabs in Israel to examine the relationships among a type of positive contact with Jews (i.e., friendships) that is likely to produce inclusive representations (Aron et al., 2005), attitudes toward Jews, perceptions of inequality, and perceptions of fairness of Jews, as well as Arabs’ support for social change toward equality. We hypothesized that because less attention to illegitimate aspects in the inequality and positive outgroup orientations may both undermine the mobilization of minority group members toward social action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) and because perceptions that progress may be made through outgroup fairness can reduce personal motivations for action (Zhang, Fishbach, & Dhar, 2007), such factors would relate to weaker support for social action for change among Arabs. As predicted, stronger friendships with Jews predicted more positive attitudes, stronger perceptions of the inequality as being just, and
increased perceptions of outgroup fairness. Improved attitudes were associated with outgroup fairness. Conceptual replicating and extending the findings from the laboratory experiment, greater perceptions of outgroup fairness and stronger perceptions of the inequality as just directly predicted lower levels of support for social change.

The results the Saguy et al. studies (in press) with laboratory groups and a minority group under naturalistic conditions converged to demonstrate that beyond improving attitudes, positive intergroup contact may lead minority group members to attend less to group inequity. These outcomes may contribute to more optimistic expectations that the outgroup will behave benevolently, which can lead to lower levels of support for social change among minority group members.

Wright and Lubensky (in press) produced compatible findings in examining data from a survey of African American and Latino/Latina students at a predominantly White university. Positive intergroup contact was associated with more favorable attitudes toward Whites and with less support for collective action. In addition, mediation analyses revealed that the negative effect of contact on collective action was in part the result of a reduction in ethnic identification. In addition, Wright et al. (2008), using methodologies designed to create common group identity (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1989), found that these interventions improved intergroup attitudes but reduced the motivation of minority group members to actively and collectively take action to improve their disadvantaged social position. Thus, because positive contact and a focus on commonality improve attitudes and blur group differences, they can undermine the necessary conditions for collective action to occur.

Taken together, the studies in this section extend our findings on the preferences of majority and minority group members for different forms of recategorization. Specifically, these results implicate the potentially strategic functions of these orientations, of which people are not fully conscious. Moreover, they suggest the importance of going beyond a focus on intergroup attitudes to consider how the nature and content of intergroup interaction can impede or facilitate meaningful social change. However, these findings do not indicate that commonality, positive intergroup contact, and intergroup harmony necessarily undermine efforts toward equality. The critical factor likely involves the nature of positive contact and how this harmony is achieved. For instance, whereas emphasis on commonality topics that are unrelated to group inequalities may deflect attention from disparities and thereby lead group members to relax their motivation for achieving equality, common identity constructed around a sense of morality and humanity would likely bring the illegitimacy of disparities to light. Such a commonality focus can bring members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups together and motivate them, perhaps in coordinated fashion, to eliminate social inequities. However, it is important, theoretically and practically, to recognize that commonality and intergroup harmony perse do not necessarily lead to intergroup equality.

**CONCLUSION**

Using the common ingroup identity model as an organizing framework, we have attempted to illustrate the challenges for improving intergroup relations—specifically, the complexity of consequences associated with creating superordinate identity. The psychological power of creating common identity, a sense of “we,” is impressive. Categorizing others as members of one’s group has a profound impact. Spontaneously, people think more deeply about and feel closer to and more positively about members of their own group (the ingroup) than about members of other groups (the outgroups). People dismiss the negative actions of ingroup members, communicate in ways that maintain positive orientations toward them, and create a psychological platform for bias against outgroup members. In addition, people are more open with, trusting of, and helpful to ingroup members than to outgroup members. The common ingroup identity model was designed to capitalize on these powerful psychological forces and redirect them to create more positive attitudes and orientations toward
others originally perceived in terms of their outgroup membership. Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence documenting the benefits of creating a common ingroup identity on intergroup orientations.

In this article, our goal was to take a broad perspective on the potential consequences of a common ingroup identity, considering the “complexity of we.” In particular, we attempted to go beyond the traditional focus of social psychological research on individual attitudes and behaviors, albeit in the context of intergroup relations, to consider structural aspects of intergroup relations. This broad perspective has been advocated by others. Wright and Lubensky (in press) have noted that work on intergroup attitudes and collective action has proceeded independently, in part because the constructs reflect different levels of analysis, with the former focused on the attitudes of majority group members and with the latter generally emphasizing the response of minority group members. Wright and Lubensky further observed that functional attempts to produce more harmonious intergroup relations can sometimes and in some ways impede progress toward creating true equality between groups. Dixon et al. (2005) observed,

Research on the contact hypothesis takes shifts in personal prejudice as its primary, and often sole, index of social psychological change. This reflects a conviction that the rehabilitation of the intolerant individual is of paramount importance to the transformation of broader patterns of intergroup relations. . . . [However] it is possible that the emotional benefits of contact may be offset by its tendency to promote acceptance of broader patterns of discrimination. (pp. 706-707)

It is thus essential that future research consider and ultimately bridge these different phenomena and levels of analysis.

In terms of new phenomena, whereas previous research on the common ingroup identity model and the effect of group representations and identification focused primarily on intergroup attitudes, future research might productively consider the impact on other outcomes, such as physical and mental well-being. To the extent that people identify with a social group, their self-concept is substantially shaped by how others think about, feel about, and treat their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Experiences of discrimination based on group membership can thus have a significant negative impact on minority group members’ mental and physical health (Stuber, Galea, Ahern, Blaney, & Fuller, 2003; Williams & Jackson, 2003).

The role of group identification in this process is important and complex. For instance, perceived discrimination can lead to stronger identification with one’s group as a way to cope with the stress of being the target of prejudice (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Sanders Thompson, 1999). In turn, greater identification with one’s group has been shown to buffer people against the potentially adverse consequences of perceived discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999; A. R. Fischer & Shaw, 1999). However, other studies demonstrate that stronger mainstream identity is related to greater personal adjustment and better mental and physical health (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000). Our work on intergroup relations demonstrates the importance of considering identification with the subgroup and the superordinate group.

Critical features to explore in further research on dual identity in particular include the relative strengths and the relationship between people’s subgroup and subordinate identities. To the extent that members of stigmatized groups identify only with a group that they perceive is marginalized or devalued and do not feel accepted as a member of the larger society, they are likely to experience higher levels of chronic stress and consequent impairment of mental and physical health (Williams & Jackson, 2003). In addition, minority group members who perceive subgroup identity and superordinate group identity to be in conflict may also have more health issues. For example, Blacks who more strongly identify with their racial group while actively rejecting White culture have higher blood pressure (Thompson, Kamarck, & Manuck, 2002) and a level of intergroup distrust that can produce an underutilization of medical, psychological, and social services (e.g., Thompson, Valdimarsdottir, Jandorf, & Redd, 2004). In contrast, members of minority groups with a dual identity who identify with their minority group and with the larger society and who see these identities as being complementary tend to be well adjusted personally, experience lower levels of stress, and engage in more health-promotive activities (Airhihenbuwa, Kumanyika, TenHave, & Morssink, 2000; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993).

Although it is difficult to argue against a recommendation to extend social psychological research on intergroup relations to be more encompassing and to pursue synthesis across levels of analysis, we agree with Wright and Lubensky (in press) that there are fundamental differences in prejudice reduction and social action approaches to achieve equality:

We find that rather than being complementary these two perspectives are divergent, even contradictory, in important ways. . . . The prejudice reduction approach focuses on themes of intergroup harmony and social cohesion. . . . From a collective action perspective conflict between groups is essential, as it is only through conflict that inequalities and injustices are recognized, challenged, and perhaps reduced. . . . The collective
action perspective speaks in terms of equality across groups, not harmony between groups, and focuses on social justice not social cohesion. (n.p.)

However, we further propose that these different approaches may be appreciated as being complementary when viewed over time as a developmental process in intergroup relations. Diversity can arouse intergroup tensions (Putnam, 2007), but the consequent increased awareness and exposure to different perspectives can lead people to make more fully deliberative and high-quality decisions (Sommers, 2006); it can enhance divergent thinking (Antonio et al., 2004); and it can facilitate novel thinking and creativity in problem solving (Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008). On the individual level, development is often described as a series of stages marked by a conflict that one needs to overcome. Similarly, studies at the interpersonal level reveal that relationships are often strengthened by periodic conflict that leads to forgiveness and reconciliation (McCullough, 2001; Ripley & Worthington, 2002). We suggest that conflict can similarly represent a healthy developmental stage on the societal or group level because it can help realize the potential of the diversity for the benefit of the group, organization, or society, rather than ignore or suppress difference.

Future research would then profit from moving beyond asking questions about the relative effectiveness of a one-group representation versus a dual identity in a particular context to studying dynamic processes over time from the perspectives of majority and minority group members. For example, in situations in which intergroup conflict has traditionally been conceived of as zero-sum relations between groups, interventions emphasizing commonality and shared fate may be valuable for reframing relations between the groups. Kelman (1999) noted that an important initial step in his intervention to reduce conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is to reframe the long-standing negative interdependence between these groups in terms of “most notably the positive interdependence between the two groups that exists in reality” (p. 581; see also Bartal, 2004). Then, to create more sustained positive intergroup relations and possibility for societal change, more attention can be devoted to the separate group identities within this superordinate group context—that is, dual identities. Kelman explained that “a long-term resolution of the conflict requires development of a transcendent identity for the 2 peoples that does not threaten the particularistic identity of each” (p. 581).

Acknowledging group-based differences in the context of common connection maintains pressures for social change by minority group members while providing an avenue for communication and exchange with majority group members. In addition, to the extent that recognizing both commonality and group-based differences helps people extend principles or morality across group lines, majority group members may more readily recognize the illegitimacy of group-based disparities and become motivated to respond fairly in a way that supersedes separate group interests (Saguy et al., 2008).

In related terms, we emphasize that group representations need to be considered within a functional perspective. The meaning of different group representations may thus vary in different historical, cultural, and political contexts. As such, although the research on acculturation demonstrates that majority groups typically prefer and respond more favorably to assimilative, one-group representations and minority groups to integrative, dual-identity orientations, these differences are not necessarily fixed. Two studies on the common ingroup identity model conducted in Portugal (Guerra, Rebelo, & Monteiro, 2005; Rebelo, Guerra, & Monteiro, 2005) experimentally manipulated fourth-grade African Portuguese children’s and European Portuguese children’s representations of themselves (using structural features, such as seating arrangement) as one group (a recategorization condition), as two subgroups within a larger six-person group (a dual-identity condition), or as two groups (a categorized control condition).

In contrast to other work on the responses of majority and minority group members to one-group (assimilation) and dual-identity (multicultural) orientations (e.g., González & Brown, 2006), the dual-identity condition was most effective at reducing the bias of higher-status European Portuguese children, whereas the one-group condition was most effective at reducing bias among the lower-status African Portuguese children. Gaertner et al. (2008) proposed that different histories of immigration may account for the cross-national differences. In contrast to that of countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, which have long histories of immigration, the immigration of significant numbers of African immigrants in Portugal did not begin until 1974, following the Portuguese revolution and the later civil wars in African countries. Therefore, the integration of African-origin people into the United States and Portugal are perhaps at different phases of societal change and development. Consequently, the stage of integration may moderate the acculturation goals of ethnic minorities and so influence the preferences of majorities. Thus, a dual identity may not be functional for second-generation lower-status African Portuguese children who may strive for assimilation and equality with European Portuguese children. For the higher-status European Portuguese children, however, the dual-identity representation affords them some degree of positive differentiation from the lower-status second-generation African Portuguese
children. Although this explanation remains untested, the finding that national context moderates the impact of different representations for majority and minority group members is empirically clear.

In conclusion, we note that social psychologists have long recognized the enormous power of “we,” but researchers are now beginning to appreciate the complexity and range of consequences for capitalizing on commonality. There are obvious and relatively immediate positive consequences for intergroup attitudes, and these effects generalize across context and time. Nevertheless, creating a sense solely of common identity and promoting more harmonious relationships can distract attention away from inequity and impede, in the long run, fundamental structural change in society. Understanding the complexity of the concept and consequences of “we” for majority and minority group members is thus essential for creating a society that is truly fair in structure and practice, not only in principle.

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