Various philosophers hold vastly different views on the question of what is moral. In this paper, I adopt the view that human actions can be viewed as highly moral if they involve an attempt to take into account others' needs while paying a significant personal cost. This definition of course is close to the notion of altruistic behavior. For example, rescuing persecuted minorities at considerable personal risk, or giving up significant personal gains when they are based on acts one views as immoral. We assume that one major source of such moral acts is what self determination theory (SDT, Ryan & Deci, 2000) defines as autonomous moral morality. The first part of the chapter focuses on the notion of autonomous morality and contrasts it with controlled morality. The concept of autonomous morality refers to moral motivations that are experienced as volitional, are based on true valuing of the moral act and are perceived as emanating from one's authentic self rather than from external or internal coercion. The concept of controlled morality denotes moral motivation and behavior driven by internal or external pressures, which are not experienced as really valuable and volitional.

IN SDT, autonomous and controlled moral motivations are viewed as located on a motivation continuum. Therefore, the chapter starts with a description of this continuum, the place of the two moral constructs of interest on this continuum, and their relations with related moral constructs. This is followed by a presentation of the consequences of autonomous versus
autonomous moral motivations for moral behavior, relationships and well being. Then, findings from our research program on socializing antecedents are described. The chapter ends with a discussion of the importance of one type of moral autonomous motivation: integrated moral motivation; namely, the propensity to act morally because the act is experienced as reflecting one's core self, central values and identity. It is proposed that this type of motivation is a crucial determinant of highly moral behavior, sense of autonomy and well being, and therefore research on its socializing antecedents and outcomes is of special interest.

The SDT Motivation Continuum as Applied to Moral or Pro-social motivation

SDT posits five types of motivations that can be placed along a continuum of perceived autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The least autonomous motivation is termed external. Behavior so regulated is experienced as originating from external contingencies involving physical threats or the offering or withdrawal of material rewards. The behaviors are experienced as clearly non-autonomous and persist only when the contingencies are present. An example of an extrinsically motivated "moral" behavior would be investing much effort to help others because this might cause others to elect one to a position from which he/she can derive material gains. Another example would be a Gestapo official who helps Jews to escape transports at the final stages of the World War II because this might help him in post war trials.

Next on the autonomy continuum we find the construct of introjected motivation. In this motivation, behavior is controlled by the desire to avoid feeling guilty, ashamed or unworthy and/or the striving to feel highly worthy. These strivings are based on the introjected reactions of meaningful others. The term introjection is derived from the Latin words “intro” and “jacere”, meaning “into” and “to throw.” Introjection is thus a process in which people feel as if values or
goals were thrown into them by figures whose appreciation they need, without having the option of modifying or even examining those values or goals (e.g., Assor, Roth & Deci, 2004).

Although in introjected motivation the enactment of behavior is not dependent on specific external contingencies, this style is still considered relatively controlled (rather than autonomous) because people feel that they are acting because they have to and not because they want to. Thus, the source of the coercion that was once external to the person has been "introjected" and now resides inside, so that he/she now feels controlled by internal contingencies that link feelings of self-esteem and social acceptance to the enactment of specific behaviors or attributes (Assor et al., 2004; Assor Vansteenkiste & Kaplan, 2009). An example of an introjected moral behavior would be investing much effort (even risking oneself) to help others in order to avoid feeling unworthy of others' esteem or love.

It is important to note that in my view, strivings motivated by self worth concerns do not necessarily signify introjected motivation. It is only when the self-worth concerns are tied with expected lack of sufficient approval or love by others that they become clearly introjected. Consistent with this view, it appears that self-related feelings may also accompany an integrated moral motivation. In this latter case, the feeling of being less worthy or guilty is tied to the perception that by acting immorally one has failed to realize values that are central to her/his authentic self and identity. The notion of guilt as related to integrated motivation appears close to the notion of existential guilt (May, 1983).

The next motivation is referred to as identified. It is considered relatively autonomous because the person has accepted the value of the activity as his or her own. Identified motivation, although not purely autonomous, is said to result from identifying with the importance of the behavior vis-à-vis the person’s own values and goals. The experience of autonomy that is
connected with identified motivation can emerge also when the activity is not pleasant. This is because this motivation is based on an understanding of the value of the behavior and not on the pleasure that it creates. An example of an identified moral behavior would be investing much or taking risk to help another person because you think this person deserves to be helped.

In the next motivation - integrated – goals and behaviors are enacted because they are experienced as reflecting core aspects of one's authentic self and identity. This linkage with core self and identity does not occur in the case of identified motivation, in which a goal or a behavior can be viewed as valuable, but is not connected to one's fundamental sense of self and identity. Because in integrated internalization goals and behaviors are experienced as emanating from the core of one's being, as complementing other core-self behaviors, and as more important than some other valued goals and behaviors, this type of motivation is experienced as more autonomous than identified motivation. To attain integrated internalization, people often have to resolve inconsistencies or conflicts between practices and goals that are important to them. This can be done by prioritizing goals and by modifying practices so that they fit each other, and most importantly, so that they reflect one's authentic inclinations and self chosen values. In SDT, this process is termed mutual assimilation of separate identifications.

In a modern or post-modern world characterized by moral relativism, conflicting moral and ideological views, and/or anomie the formation of integrated moral principles and motivation appears to be a difficult task because there might always be authorities and groups whose views might evoke serious doubts concerning various values. Therefore, it appears that the formation of truly integrated moral values often requires a process of personal exploration and reflection leading to the establishment of integrated moral commitments and values. Such a process is necessary because it increases one's confidence that the principles adopted are indeed desirable
and defensible (see Assor, Cohen-Malayev, Kaplan & Friedman, 2005; Aviram & Assor, 2010). Thus, highly integrated moral values in western countries are often based on personal exploration, reflection and choice. An example of an integrated moral behavior would be investing much or taking risk to help another person because you think and feel that helping others in need is a fundamental aspect of who you are, of your core values, and perhaps also of the identity you have formulated in a process of reflective exploration.

Another highly autonomous type of motivation is termed *intrinsic*. Actions are guided by intrinsic motives if they are done because they produce positive feelings like interest enjoyment and satisfaction. While both integrated and intrinsic motivations are experienced as highly autonomous, intrinsic motivation, unlike integrated motivation, is not originally based on external sources, and cannot involve unpleasant feelings. Within SDT, the notion of intrinsic pro-social motivation received relatively little attention and the first attempt to develop scales assessing pro-social motivation did not assess the intrinsic level (Ryan & Connell, 1989). However, I suggest that moral actions can be viewed as intrinsic if they are mainly motivated by enjoyment or by satisfaction that is based on empathic concern (Eisenberg, 2006), in which helping others causes one to feel better because the help-recipient now feels better.

Because highly moral actions exert significant personal costs which create strong unpleasant feelings, intrinsic moral motivation (i.e., motives relying only on the activity generating ongoing pleasant feelings) is not likely to suffice to motivate highly moral acts. Still, while intrinsic moral motivation is not likely to serve as a prime motivator of highly moral acts, it might join other types of moral motivation and thereby strengthen the likelihood that one would act morally. For example, while the prime motivation in taking significant risks to help persecuted minorities might be the perception that this act reflects the person's core values and
self (integrated motivation), the helping act might also be taken out of empathic concern and because it creates enjoyment based on increased sense of competence and relatedness.

Before we move on it appears important to distinguish between the SDT based moral motivations and Kohlberg's (1984) moral stages. One major difference is that the SDT constructs refer to motivation and therefore should predict actual behavior. Kohlberg's constructs refer to moral judgment rather than action. He believed that judgment is likely to affect action, but the two are still very different. Also, although people who have reached Kolberg's highest moral-judgment level are likely to have integrated moral principles, it is perhaps possible that people may have integrated moral principles while their moral judgment is not at the highest level. This can happen because in some social contexts it might be possible to internalize moral principles in an integrated way with little reflection. In addition, serious reflection may not necessarily lead to the development of Kohlberg's universal moral principles.

*Research highlighting the benefits of autonomous moral/pro-social motivation relative to controlled motivation*

So far, there were three attempts to develop scales assessing the various motivations posited by SDT in the domain of pro-social behavior. As was already noted, I consider pro-social behavior as highly moral only when it has considerable personal costs. Yet, a survey of research on the pro-social motivations posited by SDT still appears informative. The first two attempts to distinguish among the different SDT-based pro-social motivations were conducted by Ryan and Connell (1989 and then by by Gane (2000). A third attempt was conducted by Assor, Kanat-Maymon, Feinberg & Kaplan (2010). Overall, research by these investigators has shown that children and youth in both the USA and in Israel are able to distinguish between the external, interjected, identified and intrinsic types of pro-social motivation.
Two recent SDT-based investigations of pro-social motivation used a general indicator of autonomous motivation reflecting the three types of relatively autonomous motivations combined (i.e., identified, integrated and intrinsic), contrasting this global indicator with an indicator reflecting mostly introjected motivation (e.g., Weinstein & Ryan, 2010; Roth, 2008). Weinstein & Ryan (2010) performed one correlational diary study and three experiments on the relations between autonomous and controlled pro-social motivations and various types of pro-social behaviors. It was found that autonomous pro-social motivation predicted more sharing, generosity and helping than controlled (mostly introjected) motivation. Two experiments included, in addition to choice versus control conditions, also a third condition where participants were given an opportunity to do the same task, but the products where not presented as contributing to someone else (no help condition). As expected, it was found that relative to the no-help condition, autonomous motivation led to higher productivity and effort, whereas controlled motivation led to a lower level of productivity and effort.

Also as expected, work partners felt less related to participants who were not encouraged or pressured to help (no-help condition) than to participants whose help was autonomously motivated; however, work partners felt least related to participants whose help was driven by controlled motivation. Thus, it appears that autonomous help promotes the highest level or relatedness in partners, no help promotes somewhat lower level of relatedness, and controlled help promotes the lowest sense of relatedness in work partners. In addition, Weinstein and Ryan (2010) showed that, in both helpers and help-recipients, autonomous pro-social motivation was associated with more subjective well being, positive affect, vitality, self-esteem and sense of relatedness and less negative affect than was controlled motivation.
A study by Roth (2008) showed that introjected pro-social motivation predicts self-oriented helping, whereas autonomous motivation predicts other-oriented helping. Self-oriented helping was defined as helping behavior enacted for the sake of others' approval and appreciation (e.g., "When I'm helping another person, it is important for me that others will be aware of it and appreciate me for doing so"). Other-oriented helping was defined as a helping behavior that is performed while focusing on the other's needs and inclinations ("When I'm helping another person, it is important for me to know how she/he would like to be helped"). Other-oriented helping can thus be seen as a task orientation rather than an ego orientation.

Other SDT based research examined the correlates of the specific pro-social motivations separately rather than using global indicators of autonomous or controlled motivation (Assor et al., 2004; Gane, 2000; Ryan and Connell, 1989). Together, these studies suggest that identified pro-social motivation predicts higher levels of moral judgment, empathy, and engagement in pro-social activities such as donating blood, volunteering for a non-profit organization and donating money to a charitable organization. In addition, this motivation also appears to be associated with positive socio-emotional indicators such as positive affect, vitality, psychological need satisfaction, and sense of relatedness to parents and teachers. In contrast, introjected moral motivation was not found to predict higher levels of moral judgment or engagement in pro-social activities, was less predictive of empathy and sense of relatedness to parents, was associated with unstable, fluctuating, self esteem, and was not associated with positive socio-emotional indicators such as positive affect, vitality, psychological need satisfaction, and sense of relatedness to teachers. As for external pro-social motivation, as expected, this more controlled type of motivation was not predictive of pro-social actions and was negatively related to empathic concern and psychological need satisfaction, and relatedness (Gane, 2000; Ryan &
Connell, 1989). The findings regarding correlates and outcomes of autonomous versus controlled pro-social motivations are summarized in Figure 1.

The stronger association of autonomous moral/pro-social motivation with pro-social behavior and positive socio-emotional functioning relative to controlled motivation suggests that it is important to socialize children in ways that promote autonomous pro-social motivation.

**Figure 1: Correlates and outcomes of autonomous versus Controlled Pro-Social motivations**

**Autonomous motivations:**

More helping; high quality of helping in terms of effort and help-recipient's sense of relatedness; high helper's subjective well being, positive affect, vitality and self-esteem; (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010); Other oriented pro-social behavior (Roth, 2008); Engagement in pro-social activities, empathy, higher level of moral judgment, positive affect, vitality, psychological need satisfaction, feeling related to parents and teachers (Gagne, 2000; Ryan & Connell, 1989).

**Controlled motivations:**

Less helping; low quality of helping in terms of effort and help-recipient sense of relatedness; relatively low helper's subjective well being, vitality and self-esteem (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010); Self oriented pro-social behavior (Roth, 2008); low empathic concern and psychological need satisfaction (Gagne, 2000); Self esteem fluctuations (Assor et al, 2004).

The next section summarizes research by researchers from the Ben Gurion University (BGU) motivation group on socializing practices promoting autonomous versus introjected pro-social motivation, pro-social behavior, and moral judgment. We focus specifically on introjected rather than on the more global construct of controlled motivation because this is a widespread
motivator of moral/pro-social action whose socializing origins were not sufficiently studied.

**Socializing Practices Promoting Integrated Morality**

Figure 2 summarizes hypothesized effects of the socializing practices of conditional regard and autonomy support on pro-social motivation and behavior, empathy and moral judgment.

*Figure 2: Hypothesized effects of the socializing practices of conditional regard and autonomy support on pro-social motivation and behavior, empathy and moral judgment.*

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<th>Socializing Practices</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Moral Behavior</th>
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<tr>
<td>Parents' use of <strong>Conditional Regard</strong> to promote internalization of pro-social values</td>
<td>Introjected Moral Principles/motivation</td>
<td>Self-oriented pro-social behavior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Parents' and teachers' use **Autonomy Supportive** practices:  
- Taking perspective  
- Providing rationale  
- Choice provision  
- Intrinsic value-demonstration | Autonomous Moral Principles/motivation | Other-oriented pro-social behavior |

In this section, I describe BGU studies whose findings are consistent with the processes depicted in Figure 2. It should be noted that presently no study has examined all these processes simultaneously.

**Studies examining the correlates of conditional regard.**

The first study focusing on parents' use of conditional regard to promote offspring's internalization of pro-social values was conducted by Assor, Roth and Deci (2004). The concept of **Conditional regard** (CR) denotes parents' tendency to hinge their affection or esteem for their children on the child's acting in a helpful and considerate way toward others. It was found that
the perceptions of North American college students' of their mother and their father (separately) as using CR in the pro-social domain were associated with a stressful introjected internalization of pro-social principles and motivation. In this specific study, introjected motivation was assessed via the feeling that something inside oneself forces or compels one to be overly sensitive to others’ needs and feelings, and leads one to ignore her/his own needs. Other studies (e.g., Assor, Israeli, Freed, Roth, 2007) later showed that indicators of internal compulsion are closely related to the more traditional Ryan and Connell (1989) introjection measure involving reasons (i.e., I help to avoid feeling bad about myself). Assor et al (2004) also found that CR predicted frequency of students' reports of helping behavior. However, these relations were fully mediated by introjected motivation. This finding is important because it suggests that the positive effect of parental conditional regard on offspring's pro-social behavior is attained at the cost of creating a great deal of internal pressure and conflict.

The second study focusing on conditional regard in the pro-social domain was conducted by Roth (2008). The purpose of that study was to examine the hypothesis that while parents' use of CR might contribute to offspring's pro-social behavior, the emerging behavior would be self rather than other oriented. Results supported the hypothesis. In addition, as shown in Figure 2, the relation between parents' use of CR and self-oriented helping was mediated by introjected pro-social motivation. Roth (2008) findings, then, like the results obtained by Weinstein and Ryan (2010) suggest that introjected pro-social motivation leads to a lower quality of helping, namely helping that is more self oriented, less effortful, and generates a relatively low level of relatedness in the help-recipient.

The third CR study was conducted by Roth and Assor (2010). This study showed parents' use of CR to promote the suppression of negative emotions (fear and sadness) predicts offspring
tendency to suppress their negative emotions, which in turn predicts poor ability to listen and respond empathically when one's romantic partner is in distress.

The fourth investigation suggesting negative effects of CR on pro-social and moral behavior was conducted by Kanat-Maymon and Assor (2009). The authors examined, in two studies, the relations between young adults' empathic responding and their perceptions of two maternal behaviors: perceived maternal control and responsiveness to distress. The concept of perceived maternal control refers to mothers' use of both conditional regard and more directly controlling methods to promote compliance with her expectations. Regression analyses in which both maternal control and responsiveness to distress were entered as predictors showed that perceived maternal control had unique negative associations with empathic support of one's romantic partner (indicated by both self- and partner- reports) and with empathic concern for others in general, as well as a unique positive association with personal distress in response to others in need. These findings suggest that the experience of one's mother as conditionally regarding and as controlling is likely to interfere with one's empathic responding. Moreover, high levels of perceived maternal responsiveness do not cancel the negative effects of the experience of controlling parenting. The finding that the negative effect of parental control might has a robust harmful impact which cannot be cancelled by more positive parental attributes is consistent with findings obtained by other researchers (see Kanat Maymon & Assor, 2009, for a discussion).

The fifth CR study was conducted by Roth & Assor (2010) and focused on kindergarten children and their parents. Unlike the other CR studies, in this research parents' use of CR was assessed via parents' reports rather than via offspring's responses. Another innovative feature of that study was the distinction made by positive and negative types of conditional regard. In conditional positive regard (CPR), parents provide more affection and esteem when children act
on accordance with parents' expectations. In conditional negative regard (CNR), parents provide less affection when children act contrary to their expectations. It was found that parents' self-reported use of CPR to promote children's tendency to suppress feelings of sadness was negatively associated with recognition of sadness in facial expressions, and an empathic response to others' sad feelings. This finding is of special interest because it suggests that even an ostensibly more benign form of parental control – conditional positive regard – has negative effects on the development of empathy.

The correlational nature of the studies surveyed does not allow causal inferences. Yet, together these studies do suggest that parents' use of CR to promote pro-social behavior, to suppress negative emotions or to promote general child compliance with their expectations is likely to undermine the development of empathic, other oriented, pro-social orientation in children. Importantly, these harmful effects appear to emerge also when more benign forms of conditional regard are used and may not be cancelled by other more positive parents' attributes. Thus, it appears that parents' striving to foster pro-social orientation in their children would do well to minimize the use of any kind of conditional regard as a socializing practice.

Studies examining the correlates of autonomy support

The construct of autonomy support (AS) refers to behaviors which are likely to enhance children's tendency to engage in behaviors or adopt goals because they understand and/or feel their value and not because of external or internal coercion. The research of the BGU group on autonomy supportive practices has focused mainly on four autonomy supportive practices: Taking the child perspective, providing rationale for parentally expected behaviors, intrinsic value demonstration, and allowing criticism.
The first study examining the effects of one relatively new type of autonomy support - intrinsic value demonstration - was conducted by Roth and Assor (2000). Intrinsic value demonstration refers to parents' tendency to demonstrate the intrinsic value of the behaviors they expect from their children by engaging in these behaviors themselves and by showing considerable satisfaction or peacefulness as they engage in these behaviors. It is assumed that witnessing such demonstration of the intrinsic value of the expected behaviors would enhance children's motivation to engage in these behaviors. Unlike regular modeling, our emphasis is not only on the parents; actual performance of the behavior but on their positive state of mind while enacting the behavior. Roth and Assor (2000) found that students' perceptions of their parents as demonstrating the intrinsic value of pro-social actions predicted autonomous pro-social student motivation, which in turn predicted students' engagement in pro-social behavior.

The second on autonomy support investigation was part of the already mentioned Roth (2008) study. In addition to CR, this research also focused on two types of AS practices: taking the child perspective (e.g., "When parent feels that the child is not helpful enough to a friend in need, she tries to understand why") and rationale provision (e.g., "mother explains why she thinks it is important to help others"). College students' reports indicated that Autonomy-supportive parenting (indicated by both perspective taking and rationale) predicted autonomous pro-social motivation and other-oriented helping. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, autonomous motivation mediated the relations between AS and other oriented helping.

The third autonomy-support study (Roth & Assor, 2010) showed that parents use of AS to promote regulation of negative emotions (fear and sadness) predicts offspring capacity to tolerate negative emotions and explore their sources (i.e., integrative regulation), which in turn predicts the tendency to listen and respond empathically when one's romantic partner is in distress. Like
in the previous study, autonomy support was indicated by high scores on perspective taking and on rationale provision. The underlying logic was that increased capacity for tolerating and exploring negative feelings increases the capacity to listen and help when others' experience negative emotions.

The fourth AS study (Weinstock & Assor & Broide, 2009) focused on teachers and 12th grade students in two regular schools and two democratic schools. The study explored two aspects of autonomy support not investigated so far in our studies of socialization and pro-social tendencies: choice-provision and acceptance/encouragement of critical thinking. Students' level of moral judgment was assessed by their responses to various moral dilemmas. High scores on the moral dilemma measure reflect an autonomous rather than heteronomous view of morality, namely a conception of the morality that is not bound by the letter of the law or the norm, and is determined by one's sense of justice, personal principles, and consideration of intention and circumstance, so that in some cases one endorses an act as just and moral even when it is inconsistent with the law or the norm. It was found that students' perceptions of their teachers as encouraging critical thinking was positively associated with students' advanced (autonomous) moral judgment. Results also showed that being a student in a democratic school (as opposed to a regular one) was associated with a higher level of moral judgment, and that this association was mediated by students' perceptions of teachers as encouraging criticism, but not choice. A possible implication is that programs of moral education should explicitly promote teachers' inclination to encourage critical thinking in their students.

Overall, the BGU studies suggest that while parents' use of conditional regard as a socializing practice can lead children to engage in some pro-social behavior, the quality of this behavior in terms of empathic sensitivity is low. Moreover, the child engaging in this behavior may
experience feelings of internal compulsion and stress. The BGU studies also point to a clear alternative: Using autonomy supportive practices such as taking the child perspective, demonstrating the intrinsic value of the expected moral behaviors, providing rationale, and allowing criticism and open discussion of moral expectations. Specifically, it was found that children and youth who perceive their parents or educators as using these practices engage in pro-social behaviors that are more empathic and other-oriented and show higher levels of moral judgment. Moreover, offspring's engagement in pro-social actions is accompanied by a sense of choice rather than pressure. Thus, it appears that parents and educators interested in promoting morality and well being in children would do well to use autonomy supportive practices.

**The importance of integrated moral principles and behavior**

The research surveyed so far did not clearly distinguish between different types of autonomous motivation mostly because its major aim was to contrast autonomous and controlled types of motivation. However, now that the advantages of the global category of autonomous motivations are clear, it is time to examine the unique correlates of each type of autonomous motivation. In this section I propose that the autonomous motivation that is most crucial for highly moral, personally costly, behavior is integrated motivation. In addition, I also propose that integrated moral motivation also contributes much to perceived autonomy and well being.

It will be recalled that in integrated moral motivation, goals and behaviors are enacted because they are experienced as reflecting core aspects of one's authentic self and identity. Why is this motivation so crucial for highly moral actions? First, the anchoring of this motivation in one's core self and identity may provide it with the strength to endure unpleasant personal costs. Second, the other autonomous motivations – intrinsic and identified – almost by definition cannot sustain highly unpleasant and difficult. Intrinsic motivation is based only on positive
feelings such as pleasure and interest it cannot serve as the prime mover of highly moral actions that are often unpleasant and involve significant personal costs. As for identified motivation, in this type of motivation moral actions imposing significant personal demands are not perceived as much more central to one's self and identity than other more pleasant actions, and therefore these more difficult actions are not likely to preferred and adhered to.

Let us now turn to empirical evidence that is consistent with the view that integrated motivation is a crucial determinant of behaviors that are both highly moral and growth promoting. First I will survey mostly indirect evidence from SDT-based research. Then I will bring some evidence from research guided by other perspectives. Next I describe some indirect evidence from the BGU studies concerning potential well being outcomes and socializing antecedents of integrated morality. I will end with some caveats and open questions regarding the type of integrated moral motivation we would like to foster.

Gagne (2000) has shown that identified pro-social motivation was a stronger predictor of engagement in pro-social activities such as donating blood, psychological need satisfaction and empathic concern than was intrinsic pro-social motivation. The finding that identified motivation was a better predictor of pro-social actions than intrinsic motivation is consistent with findings by Burton, Lydon, D'Alessandro & Koestner (2006) showing that identified motivation is a better predictor of long term academic performance than is intrinsic motivation. According to Burton and Koestner (2006), identified motivation, which involves identification with the value and the importance of the goal, is necessary for developing and maintaining commitment to, and persistence at working toward the goal. As a result, the extent to which individuals identify with their goals is predictive of their goal commitment and progress, even in the face of considerable adversity.
Consistent with the above findings, we posit that, ideally, highly moral behavior should be based primarily on identified and integrated motivation. Perhaps even more than studying hard, highly moral actions exert considerable costs, and therefore they too must be based on deep identification and the sense that these costly actions express one's core values and identity (i.e., integrated motivation). Thus, it appears that to carry out risky moral acts people have to feel the full value and centrality of these acts to their identity and being. Given the importance of the anchoring of highly moral behavior in people's core self and identity, it is reasonable to assume that integrated motivation constitutes the strongest motivator for risky or costly moral behavior. So far research did not directly examine the unique effects of integrated moral motivation. However, in the related domain of pro-environment behaviors, it was found that integrated motivation was the best predictor of engagement in effortful environmental behaviors such as recycling and reusing materials (Pelletier, Tuson, Green-Demers, Noels & Beaton, 1998).

The importance of integrated moral motivation appears to be supported also by research based on theoretical perspectives other than SDT. For example, Piliavin, Grube, & Callero (2002) found that individuals who continue their volunteer activities from childhood to adulthood do so, to a large extent because they adopt pro-social values as a "component of the self" (p. 472). Research on people who can be considered moral exemplars also suggests the importance of integrated moral principles. For example, Colby and Damon (1992) report that these people show a great deal of value clarity and feel personally responsible for acting on their values. Moreover, their moral principles and goals are closely tied to their sense of self, so that these moral goals have central role in their conception of their own identity. Similarly, Eisenbeg, Fabes & Spinrad (2006) claim that adolescents who view morality as central to their self-concept are particularly likely to be altruistic. Hart, Atkins & Ford (1998) demonstrate the importance of
moral identity, which they describe as commitment consistent with one's sense of self to lines of action that promote or protect the welfare of others.

Research on rescuers of Jews during World War II suggests a fairly complex picture of the motives underlying these deeply humanitarian acts. However, it appears that many rescuers were motivated by integrated moral principles/motivation. For example, Monroe (2003) concludes that what drove many rescuers to take moral action is mainly the extent to which their moral values were integrated with their sense of self and identity. According to Oliner and Oliner (1989), most rescuers explain their rescue actions as responses to challenges to their fundamental ethical principles (although the authors also state that the rescuing is a product of a number of other factors). Fogelman (1994) uses the category of "moral rescuers" to describe rescuers whose concept of right and wrong was an integral and inseparable part of who they were and are.

**Outcomes and socializing antecedents of integrated moral motivation**

One basic tenet of SDT is that integrated motivation is associated with well being and growth because of its autonomous nature. Consistent with this general view, I would like to suggest that especially in western societies, integrated moral motivation might be of special importance because **integrated moral principles might be a particularly stable and satisfying source of sense of autonomy**, perhaps even more that having choice or not being externally controlled. This conception is based on the notion that the experience of autonomy can be defined in at least two ways: negative definition or "freedom from" and positive definition or "freedom for" (see Berlin, 1969; Fromm, 1941; Aviram & Assor, 2010).

In "autonomy from", the experience of autonomy is based on freedom from external coercion and the availability of behavioral choice. In "autonomy for", the experience of autonomy is based on the feeling that one has a strong internal compass: direction-giving, authentic, meaningful
values and goals, which also allow some degree of independence in making decisions and evaluating oneself. When integrated moral principles are absent, choice might in fact become a burden (Fromm, 1941). A long philosophical tradition suggests that the availability of direction-giving reflection-based values is the essence of autonomy (Aviram & Assor, 2010). Moreover, integrated direction-giving values might be especially important in post-modern western societies in which clear guidelines regarding the worthy and unworthy do not exist any more due to increasing moral relativism, and the collapse of traditional moral and ideological authorities and norms. Under these conditions, reflection-based integrated moral principles may be a crucial source of sense of autonomy and therefore vitality. While integrated principles and goals do not have to include only pro-social values, it appears that pro-social values might be particularly suitable and effective as direction-giving principles. Pro-social moral values are likely to accepted as pivotal components of people's integrated value system and identity because their important functional psycho-social benefits (Weinstein and Ryan, 2010), their cross-cultural importance and their apparent organismic (perhaps even evolutionary) foundation.

The importance of integrated principles and motivation as a source of perceived autonomy, volition and well being is supported by research conducted by the BGU group (Assor, 2009). Findings suggest that educational and informal contexts in which youth engage in free discussions and activities aimed at formulating integrated values and goals (i.e., personally meaningful choice- and reflection- based goals and values) are perceived by them as more autonomy supportive. Moreover, youth go to these places with a strong sense of volition and report feeling better and more vital when they are in these contexts. Interestingly, a similar findings were obtained in research on modern-orthodox Jewish religious families who support open dialogue and reflection on religious principles. Thus, youth growing up in these families
report feeling a higher level of integrated religious motivation, perceived autonomy, purpose, and well-being relative to youth growing in families not supporting reflection and dialogue on religious principles (Cohen-Malayev, 2008; Assor et al, 2005). Figure 3 presents some hypothesized effects and sources of integrated moral principles.

The studies focusing on the emergence of integrated goals and values in youth (Assor, 2009) have identified two autonomy supportive practice that were under-emphasized in previous SDT research. The first is educators' or parents' support of reflective value/goal exploration (SRVE). This variable refers to discussions and activities that enable youth to examine the extent to which they see various goals and values as worthy and personally meaningful. Another practice that appears to promote the formation of integrated values is termed "Fostering Inner Directed Valuing Processes" (FIV). This construct has three components: Helping children to calm down before they have to make serious decisions, encouraging examination of one's values and goals when faced with a difficult decision or external pressures, and encouraging consideration of alternatives and relevant information before making a decision.

_Figure 3: Integrated Moral Principles: Hypothesized Antecedents and Outcomes_

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<th>Outcomes</th>
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<td>Integrated moral principles</td>
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FIV differs from support for reflective value/goal exploration (SRVE) in that it is a socializing practice that is used only when the child faces difficult decisions and social pressures and, unlike SRVE, it provides a certain "training" in authentic and rational decision making under stress. In contrast, SRVE refers to general encouragement of reflective discussion of
exploration. FIV is hypothesized to contribute to the formation of integrated values and goals because it helps youth to develop the capacity to withstand the difficulties involved in value exploration. Thus, youth who have often engaged in inner-directed valuing are assumed to develop skills and tendencies that would enable them to seriously examine their own thoughts, ideals and inner feelings when they determine their important goals and form commitments. Our research shows that adolescents’ perceptions of their parents as high on FIV indeed predict identity-exploration and the formation of commitments that are experienced as autonomous.

So far I presented integrated moral motivation as a highly desirable attribute. However, research people who appear to be guided by integrated moral principles might be highly intolerant toward those not sharing their views (e.g., Skitka, in press). Therefore, in socializing and education processes aimed at supporting the growth of integrated moral motivation it is important to include extensive discussions of the values of tolerance for different opinions.

Overall, the BGU studies on integrated values suggest that reflective formation of such values has a salutary effect on the development of perceived autonomy, sense of purpose and vitality, and there are two, relatively under-emphasized, socializing practices that can support the emergence of such values: Fostering inner valuing and supporting reflective value exploration. Future research may focus on the outcomes and antecedents of integrated pro-social values.

References


internalization of religion among Israeli Jewish youth. *Advances in Motivation and Achievement, 14*, 105-150.


