

Beyond criticism: Logrolling and decoy voting in the United Nations*

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* We thank for comments in the course of our research on this topic Michael Beenstock, Paula Castro, Dror Goldberg, Francesco Forte, Arthur Fishman, Raphael Franck, Simon Hug, Jean-Dominique Lafay, Pierre Kopp, Ngo Van Long, Mickaël Melki, Yew-Kwang Ng, George Tridimas, Heinrich W. Ursprung and Avi Weiss. Miriam Breckner, Carl Maier, Daniel Mannfeld, and Quyen Ngo provided excellent research assistance. Results based on preliminary limited data (Hillman and Potrafke, 2011) were presented at the 2011 conference on The Political Economy of International Organizations in Zurich, the 2011 Meetings of the Public Choice Society in San Antonio, the 2011 Meetings of the European Public Choice Society in Rennes, and the 2011 Meetings of the European Association of Law and Economics in Hamburg. We thank for their comments conference participants and participants in seminars at which versions of the paper were presented.

Abstract

In United Nations General Assembly resolutions in the two decades from 1990 that name a country, the state of Israel is named in 64 percent of resolutions and is involved in 75 percent of resolutions when related resolutions naming neighbors are included. In comparison, other countries, if named, receive minor attention. We propose a theory of expressive behavior that predicts logrolling and decoy voting and explains the extraordinary focus on one country in the voting record. In usual cases, decoy resolutions pass with large supermajorities. An atypical case in which usual supermajorities are absent confirms the role of self-interest in UN voting and provides a case study that gives content to decoy voting. Our theory, empirical estimates, and conclusions are independent of the identity of the decoy. We note alternatives to the decoy-voting hypothesis that, in contrast, focus on the identity of the decoy.

Keywords: United Nations; Logrolling; Decoy voting; Expressive voting; Autocracy; Democracy; International organizations; Bureaucracy; Israel

1. Introduction

A substantial political-economy literature is concerned with the theory and consequences of voting. We study voting in the United Nations General Assembly where there is global representation of governments. Most United Nations General Assembly resolutions are passed by acclamation. We consider resolutions that pass with majority voting. The resolutions, although majority supported, are non-binding. Voting is visible. Governments tend to vote in blocs. An autocratic voting bloc has, in particular, the numbers to control General Assembly resolutions and to pass any majority-supported resolution that it wishes.¹

Against this background, we investigate the motives for participation in the visible voting on non-binding UN General Assembly resolutions. With resolutions non-binding, why does it matter how governments vote – or are seen to vote?²

It has been proposed (by Marín-Bosch, 1987, Annan, 2000, and others) that, although non-binding, UN resolutions General Assembly nonetheless

¹ On the political economy of voting, see for example Tullock (1959) and Nurmi (2006). For a comparison of voting systems, see Nurmi (1987). For an overview of the theory of voting, see Hillman (2009, chapter 6). See Hug (2012) on resolutions passed by acclamation and the recording of countries' votes. On the voting blocs, which date from early days of the United Nations, see Hovet (1960), Iida (1988), and Kim and Russett (1996).

² When we subsequently refer to UN voting, the intention is UN voting in the General Assembly.

have “moral force” or impart “moral suasion”, because governments respond to criticism in the resolutions by beneficially changing behavior. A variation on the proposal of “moral force” or “moral suasion” is the theory of self-interested expressive behavior. Expressive behavior distinguishes between material utility from consumption and wealth and expressive utility that can be associated with identity. Expressive behavior is rational and self-interested.³

Expressive utility has been applied to explain voting when an individual voter is non-decisive in determining voting outcomes. There are presumptively expressive motives present when, as in the UN General Assembly, voting takes place on resolutions that are non-binding. The visible voting in blocs on the non-binding resolutions expressively confirms identity or “belonging”, through display of adherence to a collective statement of opinion that differs from an alternative opinion.

With the motives of expressive utility present, “moral force” or “moral suasion” is not required to spontaneously evoke ethical behavior but governments incur expressive disutility if publicly censured in a UN resolution in a forum of peers and internalize the likelihood of criticism in choosing policies and deciding how to act. Through expressive utility, non-

³ On expressive voting, see, amongst others, Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Schuessler, (2000), Engelen (2006), Drinkwater and Jennings (2007), and Hillman (2010). For surveys, see Hamlin and Jennings (2011) and Brennan and Brooks (2012). The identity-based theory of expressive utility is set out in Hillman (2010). On identity in other contexts, see Akerlof and Kranton (2010).

binding UN censure resolutions – or the prospects of such resolutions – are then beneficial in causing governments to act according to self-interest as if subject to moral restraint. In particular, the claim follows that, by restraining repression because of the expressive disutility of criticism (or loss of face), non-binding UN resolutions benefit populations living under autocratic rule.

Our study concludes that the contrary is the case. Our theory of voting demonstrates the counterfactual circumstances in which the prospect of criticism in UN resolutions would indeed benefit populations under autocratic rule. We conclude, however, that, in actual circumstances, criticism is silenced or contained and deflected.

Autocratic governments avoid criticism at home by suppressing free speech: as described by Kuran (1995), under autocracy, “public lies” displace “private” truth. Our theory of UN voting predicts logrolling in the United Nations whereby autocratic governments agree not to vote to criticize one another. The voting record confirms that as a rule autocratic governments are protected from UN censure resolutions.

The voting record shows a preponderance of resolutions calling for a better world that pass by acclamation. In the resolutions on which a vote takes place and governments’ votes are recorded, some resolutions do not refer to any particular country. In the resolutions in which a country is named – and in which any country could in principle be named – there is an extraordinary focus on one country. We shall present data showing that, in the two decades from 1990, 64 percent of resolutions that name a country

name the state of Israel. Being named in a majority of resolutions, Israel occupies first place in the list of countries named. In second and third places, named in 6 percent and 5 percent of cases, are two countries that neighbor Israel and whose activities during the data period in the context of UN attention also relate to Israel. When these resolutions are included, the proportion of resolutions involving Israel is 75 percent. Some other resolutions also involve the state of Israel. We explain the focus on one country as an instance of decoy voting (Herne, 1997).

The voting record shows that decoy resolutions pass with supermajority support. The size of the supermajorities – 87 percent on average – indicates extended logrolling. Ordered probit estimation confirms that, in the usual resolutions involving the decoy, there is equal likelihood of autocracies and democracies voting against the decoy.

Other studies – Wittkopf (1973), Kuziemko and Werker (2006), Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2008), Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009), Dreher and Vreeland (2011), and Dreher and Sturm (2012) – have investigated vote buying in the United Nations. We find extensive vote trading.

The voting record reveals two related resolutions in which usual supermajorities are atypically absent. Because of the exceptionality, we study the resolutions in detail. Ordered probit estimation shows defection by governments of democracies from logrolling with the autocratic bloc. The exceptional resolutions confirm the role of self-interest in UN voting and provide a case study to give content to the hypothesis of decoy voting.

Our conclusions are independent of the identity of a decoy. We address, however, two alternative interpretations that focus on the revealed identity of the decoy.

2. A model of voting incentives of autocracies

In this section, we motivate and present our model, focusing on predictions regarding voting behavior of autocracies. A subsequent section presents considerations influencing voting behavior of governments of autocracies.

2.1 Background: Expressive behavior and identity

Much of human behavior is associated with identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Identity can be tied to the motives for expressive behavior (Hillman, 2010). People benefit expressively from judgments that confirm personal priors. Rather than being guided by data or objective information, people may choose to vote expressively based on believing what they want to believe (Caplan, 2008). Rational participation in voting has a purpose. If a vote is believed to be decisive, the purpose is to determine the voting outcome. If the likelihood of being decisive is known to be insignificant, the motivation for participation in voting can be to expressively confirm a sought identity. When voting is visible, a sought identity can be openly displayed through voting.

The identity sought to be displayed need not be consistent with actual actions (Tullock, 1971; Hillman, 2010). Autocratic rulers are prone to being open to criticism but have expressive reasons for wishing themselves to be

regarded as popular and “loved by the people”.⁴ Charles Rowley (2000) describes paternalistic benevolent identity portrayed by autocratic rulers. Two more recent examples of autocratic rulers proclaiming benevolence and popularity are:

“The state is like a mother or father who embraces everyone and accommodates all her children.”⁵

“They love me. All my people are with me.”⁶

Our theory of UN voting describes autocratic rulers and governments as losing expressively if criticized in UN resolutions and as benefitting expressively from showing care for oppressed people by visibly voting to criticize the behavior of someone else.⁷

⁴ On impediments to political compromise by autocratic governments, see (Dixit, Grossman, and Gul, 2000). Requisites of regime security prevent autocratic rulers from acting benevolently (Hillman, 2007; Easterly, 2011). Regime security protects wealth: Kimenyi and Mbaku (1996) and Cassing (2000) describe wealth accumulated from autocratic rule; Daloz (2003) describes the contestability of autocratic incumbency; Gupta et al. (2001, 2004) describe military spending by autocratic governments that confront no ostensible external threats.

⁵ Bashar Al-Assad, the ruler of Syria:
<https://arabrevolt.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/speech-bashar-al-assad-june-20-2011/>.

⁶ Muammar Gaddafi, former ruler of Libya:
<http://www.euronews.net/2011/03/01/my-people-love-me-libya-s-gaddafi/>.

⁷ The implications of our theory of expressive motives for behavior apply more broadly. For example, Vreeland (2008a) has proposed that domestic politics explain

Our theory of UN voting acknowledges motives of expressive behavior but does not exclude material benefits and costs. Coincident with expressive utility, for autocratic governments, there are material costs of repression and material benefits from regime security. For governments of democracies, we identify material benefits from logrolling with the automatic-majority autocratic bloc.

We begin exposition of our theory of voting with counterfactual absence of UN resolutions. We then show how censure resolutions could in principle discipline autocratic behavior. Logrolling preempts the discipline of prospective censure. Decoy voting deflects attention from own behavior and allows visible display of disapproval of repression and human-rights violations.

2.2 Political institutions and repression

There are n countries (with $n = 192$ in our data period). Political institutions are measured on a continuum $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ from maximal democracy to maximal autocracy, with country i located at $\theta_i \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$. We view institutions as exogenous, although institutions can of course change (see for example

accession by dictatorships to the United Nations convention against torture. Another explanation is expressive utility from display of benevolent identity while engaged in autocratic repression.

Congleton, 2011). Government i chooses a level of repression $R_i \in [0, \bar{R}]$ to maximize utility:⁸

$$U_i = \{B_i(R_i, \theta_i, X_i) - C_i(R_i, \theta_i, Y_i)\} + V_i. \quad (1)$$

B_i is material utility from regime security. C_i is the material or resource cost of repression. B_i and C_i depend on political institution θ_i . X_i denotes other exogenous influences on benefit and Y_i exogenous influences on cost (such as terrain, ethnic fractionalization, and tribal loyalties). X_i and Y_i have representations as controls in our empirical application of the model. V_i is expressive utility. In the absence of UN voting, the forum of peers in which to display identity is not available and expressive utility has no role. Without a role for expressive utility, the Kuhn-Tucker condition for choice of R_i is

$$R_i \cdot \left[\frac{\partial B_i(R_i, \theta_i, Y_i)}{\partial R_i} - \frac{\partial C_i(R_i, \theta_i, Y_i)}{\partial R_i} \right] = 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, n. \quad (2)$$

Autocracies choose $R_i^* > 0$ and democracies choose $R_i^* = 0$. There is also a corner solution at an upper bound of repression. We set aside democracies.

For r autocracies, with

$$\left[\frac{\partial^2 B_i}{\partial R_i \partial \theta_i} - \frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial R_i \partial \theta_i} \right] > 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, r, \quad (3)$$

it follows that

⁸ See Hillman (2010) for the utility function. Additivity is incidental in (1). We also do not state evident concavity and convexity assumptions.

$$\frac{dR_i^*}{d\theta_i} = -\frac{1}{\frac{\partial^2 U_i}{\partial R_i^2}} \left[\frac{\partial^2 B_i}{\partial R_i \partial \theta_i} - \frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial R_i \partial \theta_i} \right] > 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, r. \quad (4)$$

More autocratic regimes thus choose greater repression.⁹

2.3 Voting on non-binding UN resolutions

We now introduce non-binding UN censure resolutions. Even if a government were decisive, resolutions are non-binding. To explain visible voting on non-binding resolutions, we reintroduce expressive utility. An autocratic ruler i has expressive utility $\phi_{ij} \geq 0$ from visibly voting in favor of a resolution that criticizes a government j and conversely incurs expressive disutility $\psi_{ji} \leq 0$ if criticized by government j . Governments therefore impose mutual negative voting externalities on one another (Tullock, 1959) if they vote to criticize one another. The number of governments voting to censure a government matters. Which government vote to censure or not can also matter. We focus here on numbers, or the significance of supermajorities.¹⁰ ϕ_{ij} increases with the number of other governments n_{ij} that join government i in voting to censure government j :

$$\phi_{ij} = \phi_{ij}(n_{ij}), \quad \phi'_{ij}(n_{ij}) > 0. \quad (5)$$

⁹ It is sufficient for (3) and therefore (4) to hold that the marginal benefit from repression declines with the measure of autocracy and the marginal cost of repression increases.

¹⁰ On supermajorities in a different context, see Gloseclose and Snyder (1996).

The disutility ψ_{ji} of government i from being censured in a resolution increases with the number of governments m_{ji} that join another government j in supporting the censure resolution:

$$\psi_{ji} = \psi_{ji}(m_{ji}), \psi'_{ji}(m_{ji}) < 0. \quad (6)$$

The probability P_i that a censure resolution is against government i increases with government i 's repressive behavior and declines with repression by other governments. If all governments vote to criticize one another and no government votes to criticize itself, $(r-1)$ governments vote in favor of a censure resolution against any other government. In that case, $\phi_i = \phi_i(r-1)$ and $\psi_i = \psi_i(r-1)$. In the utility function (1), the expressive component of utility is:

$$V_i = P_i(R_1, R_2, \dots, R_r)\psi_i + [(1 - P_i(R_1, R_2, \dots, R_r))\phi_i] \quad i = 1, \dots, r \quad (7)$$

with

$$\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial R_i} = \frac{\partial P_i}{\partial R_i} [\psi_i - \phi_i] < 0 \quad i = 1, \dots, r. \quad (8)$$

In (8), increased repression, by making a censure resolution more likely, increases the likelihood of disutility from censure and also increases the likelihood of forgoing utility by not having the opportunity to vote to censure others. Repression is determined by:

$$\frac{\partial B_i}{\partial R_i} = \left[\frac{\partial C_i}{\partial R_i} - \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial R_i} \right] > \frac{\partial C_i}{\partial R_i} \quad i = 1, \dots, r. \quad (9)$$

The discipline of disutility of censure therefore makes governments repressive as compared to when governments are not subject to censure resolutions.

Rather than a government being chosen probabilistically for censure, voting on censure resolutions can take place deterministically and simultaneously. The r governments confront a prisoners' dilemma and in a Nash equilibrium find themselves in a "tragedy of the commons". To visibly display an identity of benevolence, each government supports resolutions that censure any other government but each government incurs disutility because of censure of its own behavior. In the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, repression is restrained because the disutility of being criticized.

2.4 Logrolling

The "tragedy of the commons" is avoided by logrolling whereby the r governments agree not to vote to censure one another. The logrolling agreement is enforceable because voting is visible. A government cannot gain from defection from the logrolling agreement: a defector would be subject to censure resolutions while governments adhering to the logrolling agreement gain by having the defector to criticize.

2.5 Decoy voting

With logrolling forestalling mutual criticism inside the logrolling bloc, expressive utility from voting to criticize another government requires choosing for criticism a country from outside the logrolling bloc. In principle, a government inside the logrolling bloc can vote to criticize any government that it wishes outside the bloc. There are, however, benefits from coordination

in choosing who is to be criticized. One government voting alone to criticize another government provides little effect from voting to criticize. Many governments voting together to censure a chosen country is more effective – because of the force of numbers, as in (5). We define a country that is chosen for censure as a decoy. The decoy need not be unique. Effectiveness is however maximized by resolutions directed at a single decoy. With at least all members of the autocratic bloc voting to accuse a chosen decoy J , $n_{ij} \geq r$. n_{ij} increases if governments outside the autocratic logrolling bloc join in decoy voting.

3. Voting by governments of democracies

From equation (2), governments of democracies have no direct interest in decoy voting. In deciding how to vote, governments of democracies, like autocracies, maximize utility with material and expressive components. Although UN resolutions are non-binding, there are benefits from majority voting (or supermajority) within the United Nations. With the autocratic bloc having an automatic majority, all such benefits require support of the autocratic bloc.

The benefits include national prestige from election to the Security Council and to various UN subcommittees (on the structure of the United Nations, see Fasulo, 2004). Beyond expressive prestige, election to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council may also bring material benefit – see Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009).

Personal career opportunities of UN representatives are enhanced by national representation on UN committees and subcommittees. Vaubel (1991) describes the personal benefits obtainable within international organizations. Glazer (2008) describes voting to please or anger. In the United Nations, the benefits for a country's representatives from voting to please and not anger other governments include invitations to social events such as independence-day or national-day celebrations. National politicians who can give directives for voting to UN delegations can benefit personally from congeniality in relations with officials of autocratic governments.¹¹

There is expressive utility from voting to censure the decoy if the decoy is "disliked". Expressive utility can also be the reason for refusal to participate in decoy voting.

¹¹ There can be problems when an autocrat's rule is disrupted. As an example, in February 2011, the French foreign minister Michèle Alliot-Marie resigned from office after revelations that she had offered French anti-riot police to the Tunisian government to repress demonstrators seeking democracy. She had spent her year-end vacation in Tunisia, traveling in a private plane belonging to a businessman with links to the autocratic Tunisian ruler. Some short time before demonstrations ended the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, French Prime Minister François Fillon had been flown to Egypt in a private plane together with his family as a guest of the government of Egypt for an end-of-year vacation. The favors to the high French government officials received media attention only after the authoritarian rulers had left office.

4. Voting predictions

For governments of autocracies, our voting model predicts logrolling and decoy voting. Governments of democracies that are guided by the internal UN benefits of logrolling with a majority bloc or other benefits “from voting to please” autocracies are predicted to join in censure of the decoy.

5. Empirical specification and descriptive statistics

To empirically investigate voting behavior of autocratic and democratically elected governments, we define the variable “*Vote*” for the voting behavior of the members of the UN General Assembly, with three possible outcomes: 0 for a country voted in favor of the resolution, 1 for a country that abstained, and 2 for a country voted against the resolution. The variable “*Vote*” has an ordered structure and we therefore employ the ordered probit model as an estimator. In our base-line model, abstentions are an option between voting in favor and against a resolution.¹² To measure democracy, we use both the Chief Executive component of the POLITY IV index¹³ and the Democracy and

¹² For a discussion of treatment of abstentions in voting in the United Nations General Assembly, see Boockmann and Dreher (2011).

¹³ Democracy and autocracy have been measured using the Freedom House and the POLITY IV indices. However, several problems have been noted with these measures (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, Vreeland 2008b, and Cheibub et al. 2010). The POLITY IV index is useful because of the components of the dataset (Cheibub et al., 2010, p. 76). The five components of the POLITY index are XCONST (Constraints on

Dictatorship (DD) measure of José Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi and James Vreeland (2010). The POLITY IV subindex has seven levels from most autocratic to most democratic institutions. The DD measure distinguishes regimes according to whether executive and legislative offices are filled through contested elections and is dichotomous, taking on the value one for democracies and zero otherwise. We use data on regime characteristics for the average over the period 2004-2008.

The base-line ordered probit model has the form:

$$Vote_{ij} = \alpha + \beta Democracy_i + z_i Z_i + u_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, s. \quad (10)$$

$Vote_{ij}$ is the voting behavior of country i on resolution j ; $Democracy_i$ is the democracy measure; and Z_i is a vector of controls that may contribute to explaining how countries vote. We apply (10) to voting on UN General Assembly resolutions.

chief executive), XRCOMP (Competitiveness of executive recruitment), XROPEN (Openness of executive recruitment), PARCOMP (Competitiveness of political participation), and PAREG (Regulation of political participation). Cheibub et al. (2010) describe the Chief Executive variable as providing “useful information about whether the chief executive has unlimited authority, whether there is a legislature with slight or moderate ability to check the power of the executive, whether the legislature has substantial ability to check the executive, or whether the executive has parity with or is subordinate to the legislature”.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
POLITY IV – Constraints on Chief Executive	157	4.97	2.02	1	7	Marshall and Jagers (2006)
Democracy-Dictatorship	191	0.59	0.48	0	1	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Democracy-Dictatorship (expansive – type 2)	191	0.80	0.37	0	1	Cheibub et al. (2010)
GDP per capita (real)	184	12573.26	15367.39	234.46	82477.16	Penn World Tables 7.0 Summers and Heston (1991)
Africa	192	0.28	0.45	0	1	Own Calculation
Asia	192	0.24	0.43	0	1	Own Calculation
America	192	0.18	0.39	0	1	Own Calculation
Oceania	192	0.07	0.26	0	1	Own Calculation
Europe	192	0.23	0.42	0	1	Own Calculation
OECD	192	0.16	0.36	0	1	Own Calculation
Warsaw Pact	192	0.12	0.33	0	1	Own Calculation
Legal Origin (British)	188	0.34	0.47	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (German)	188	0.03	0.18	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (French)	188	0.43	0.50	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (Scandinavian)	188	0.03	0.16	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (Socialist)	188	0.18	0.39	0	1	La Porta et al. (1999)
Muslim	192	24.03	36.44	0	100	Alesina et al. (2003)
Oil Exporter	192	0.09	0.28	0	1	Easterly and Sewadeh (2001)
Control of corruption	175	3.97	2.09	1.5	9.5	Transparency International (2012)

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. Control variables meet concerns about omitted variables bias. Real GDP per capita accounts for the possibility that voting is determined by a country's income independently of political institutions. A set of regional dummy variables allows a test of whether voting is influenced by the voting of neighboring countries. To avoid perfect collinearity between the regional dummies, Europe is a reference category. Legal origin is included (see La Porta et al., 1999) with French as the reference category. We include OECD and former Warsaw Pact dummy variables (see Boockmann and Dreher, 2011). Muslim-majority and corruption variables are included for robustness tests. We do not use data on coups: absence of coups is the consequence of

successful repression. We also do not use data on human-rights violations. The human-rights data report indicators such “disappearances” and “political imprisonment” for selected countries but all-inclusive data is not available for all members of the United Nations.¹⁴

6. The voting record

To obtain values for $Vote_{ij}$ in equation (10), we compiled data for all 1535 UN General Assembly resolutions for the two decades between January 1990 and June 2011. We categorized the resolutions according to whether a resolution named a country. The data, shown in table 2, reveal that the state of Israel is named in 64 percent of resolutions that name a country. The next two countries in table 2, with 6 and 5 percent of resolutions respectively, are immediate neighbors of Israel. Resolutions naming these countries in the data period also pertain to Israel.¹⁵ Including the latter resolutions increases the proportion of UN resolutions relating to Israel to 75 percent. Addition of

¹⁴ See <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/>. On compromise of the human-rights data, see <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/>. On compilers of the data, see: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/opinion/20bernstein.html> , <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article.php?viewall=yes&id=2456> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/15/human-rights-watch-nazi-israel>.

¹⁵ Between 1990 and 2011, resolutions naming neighboring countries Lebanon and Syria concerned renewal of mandates of United Nations peace-keeping forces on the borders of these countries with Israel.

resolutions proposing linkage to Apartheid South Africa further increases the number of resolutions involving the state of Israel.¹⁶

We define a decoy as a country that is “disproportionately” named in UN resolutions. The voting data in table 2 indicate that the state of Israel uniquely satisfies such a decoy criterion. Countries other than the state of Israel, if at all mentioned, have minor presence.¹⁷

The voting record shows autocratic governments avoid censure for the day-to-day repression required for ongoing regime security. Extraordinary autocratic repression may – but need not – result in being named in a UN resolution. If the state of Israel is a decoy, other governments that have engaged in massive repression will be underrepresented in the voting record.

During the data period, there was extraordinary repression by the government of Rwanda (Barnett, 2002) and by the government of Indonesia in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and in particular East Timor (Maogoto, 2008). The names of Rwanda and Indonesia do not appear in table 2.

¹⁶ The data in table 2 is for voting on resolutions in the General Assembly but the origins of resolutions are UN committees and subcommittees (Hug, 2013).

¹⁷ The decoy criterion can be given precision by a measure of concentration. The distribution in table 2 makes such a measure redundant. The Herfindahl index is readily computable and confirms extreme concentration.

Table 2: UNGA resolutions naming countries, January 1990 to June 2011

Rank	Country	Number of resolutions	Share of resolutions	Share of Yes-votes
1	Israel including reference to Palestinian territories	350	0.64	0.87
2	Syria	33	0.06	0.75
3	Lebanon	26	0.05	0.96
4	Cuba	24	0.04	0.77
5	Iran	18	0.03	0.44
6	Iraq	13	0.02	0.70
7	South Africa	13	0.02	0.79
8	Sudan	12	0.02	0.59
9	DR Congo	8	0.01	0.59
10	Kosovo	6	0.01	0.71
11	PDR Korea	6	0.01	0.55
12	Bosnia and	5	0.01	0.78
13	Myanmar	5	0.01	0.55
14	Yugoslavia	5	0.01	0.88
15	Georgia	4	0.01	0.29
16	Kuwait	3	0.01	0.99
17	Nigeria	3	0.01	0.56
18	South Africa & Israel	3	0.01	0.63
19	Turkmenistan	3	0.01	0.42
20	Belarus	2	0.00	0.40
21	Guam	2	0.00	0.86
22	American Samoa	1	0.00	0.95
23	Anguilla	1	0.00	0.95
24	Azerbaijan	1	0.00	0.27
25	Bermuda	1	0.00	0.95
26	British Virgin Islands	1	0.00	0.95
27	Cambodia	1	0.00	0.83
28	Cayman Islands	1	0.00	0.95
29	Uzbekistan	1	0.00	0.44
	Sum	549	1.00	0.81
	Not imputable to a country	986		0.83
	Total	1535		0.82

A comparator for a government whose name does appear in table 2 is Sudan. During the data period, the government of Sudan was engaged in repression in the South Sudan and in Darfur. In the Darfur region, estimates are of 500,000 deaths, displacement of 2.7 million people, and mass rape (Maogoto and Kindiki, 2007; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond; 2008; Hagen et al. 2009; Olsson and Valsechhi, 2010). Sudan is named 12 times in table 2.¹⁸ The decoy is named 350 times.

The decoy role is noted prior to the data period in table 2. A prior description is:

*“What takes place..more closely resembles a mugging than either a political debate or an attempt at problem-solving. (The decoy) is cast as the villain in [a] melodrama..that features..many attackers and a great deal of verbal violence.”.*¹⁹

The decoy role has been noted after the data period in table 2.²⁰

¹⁸ On the United Nations and Darfur, see:

<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-03-30-voa18-66707577.html>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/world/africa/19briefs-Darfur.html>.

¹⁹ Jean Kirkpatrick, U.S. representative to the United Nations, quoted by Rosen (2010). The continuation adds intimidation: *“The attackers, encountering no obstacles, grow bolder, while other nations become progressively more reluctant to associate themselves with the accused, out of fear that they themselves will become the target of bloc hostility.”*

²⁰ On decoy resolutions after the time period of the data in table 2, see:

<http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/07/30/syrians-slaughtered-but-u-n-too-busy-condemning-israel-3-times/>.

7. Usual resolutions

The voting record in table 2 does not distinguish countries by political institutions. Other than in two related exceptional resolutions to which we shall presently turn, the resolutions naming the decoy pass with large supermajorities and with little variation in voting by individual countries. There is no added information to be obtained from empirical estimation using the complete dataset or an extended sample. The complete country-by-country dataset for the voting record in table 2 is available upon request. Because of the lack of variation in the voting data, we chose for estimation representative resolutions in 2009. We chose 2009 because resolutions in that year include two exceptional resolutions with atypical voting outcomes, which we investigate because of the exceptionality in the following section. In 2009 there were in total 301 General Assembly resolutions. Recorded voting took place on 69 of the resolutions. A country was named in 23 of the 69 resolutions. Of the 23 resolutions naming a country, 21 named the decoy.²¹

²¹ The other two countries named in UN resolutions in 2009 were Myanmar, where in the course of repression the government had killed unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators including Buddhist monks, and the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, a communist dictatorship that had acted opportunistically with regard to agreements regarding its nuclear program and was viewed as complicit through privileged aid distribution in mass-starvation of its people.

Table 3 shows the representative 2009 resolutions. A vote in favor of the resolution is a vote against the decoy.²²

Table 3: Representative 2009 UN General Assembly votes involving Israel

UN vote	Against	Abstain	In favor	Not voting	Subject
A/RES/64/92 20091210	6	4	168	14	Applicability of the Geneva Convention
A/RES/64/94 20091210	9	5	162	16	Practices by Israel affecting human rights
A/RES/64/185 20091221	8	7	165	12	Limitations on Israel's borders and sovereignty

Source: United Nations

Regression results shown in table 4 confirm that the likelihoods of a democracy and an autocracy voting against the decoy are not significantly different. This remains so when income and other controls are added as explanatory variables.²³

²² In the resolutions in table 3, the United States and Nauru consistently supported Israel, joined in general by Australia and Canada, and Pacific Island states that tend to vote together with the United States (Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau). Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Fiji consistently abstained. Other abstentions were from Liberia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

²³ Because the absence of variation in the voting data, we estimated voting behavior on the individual resolutions separately rather than a panel data model using multiple resolutions.

Table 4: Regression results, ordered probit, robust standard errors, coefficient estimates

Dependent variable: UNGA Votes on resolutions A/RES/64/185, /RES/64/92, A/RES/64/94

	Resolution	A/RES/64/185 20091221		A/RES/64/92 20091210		A/RES/64/94 20091210	
	Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Only democracy variable included	POLITY IV - Constraints on Chief Executive	0.1056		0.0105		0.1101	
		[1.20]		[0.10]		[1.21]	
	Democracy-Dictatorship		0.4386		0.285		0.4543
			[1.56]		[0.90]		[1.57]
GDP included	POLITY IV - Constraints on Chief Executive	0.0385		-0.0388		0.0734	
		[0.57]		[0.49]		[0.89]	
	Democracy-Dictatorship		0.2357		0.1846		0.3617
			[0.84]		[0.61]		[1.32]
Full model	POLITY IV - Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.016		-0.0447		0.0223	
		[0.10]		[0.28]		[0.17]	
	Democracy-Dictatorship		0.2778		0.2714		0.2642
			[0.61]		[0.58]		[0.64]

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level

8. The exceptional resolutions

8.1 Resolutions without usual supermajorities

In two exceptional resolutions in 2009, the usual supermajorities in votes against the decoy are absent. Table 5 shows the voting outcomes for the exceptional resolutions.

Table 5: Voting on resolutions related to the Goldstone Report

UN vote	Against	Abstain	In favor	Not voting	Subject
A/64/L.10 20091105	18	44	114	16	Acceptance of the Goldstone report
A/RES/64/91 20091210	9	74	92	17	Work of the special committee to investigate Israel's human rights practices

Source: United Nations

The number of countries voting against the decoy declines in table 5 to 114 in the first resolution and 92 in the second resolution, from the average of 165 for the resolutions in table 3.

Table 6 shows regression results for estimation of equation (10) for the first vote in table 5 for an ordered probit model with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is coded such that positive coefficients on the explanatory variables indicate a vote against the resolution in favor of the decoy. The results including controls indicate defection by democracies from decoy voting.

Columns (1) and (2) in table 6 show results without control variables. We present the base-line results to show that the inferences are not driven by potential collinearity problems due to democracy being correlated with variables such as real GDP per capita. Columns (3) and (4) include the log of

real GDP per capita as a control variable and show a positive sign and statistical significance at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of the Chief-in-Executive measure of democracy has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in columns (1) and (3) and at the 10 percent level in column (5). The Democracy-Dictatorship variables in columns (2), (4) and (6) have positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in columns (2) and (4) and at the 5 percent level in column (6).²⁴

²⁴ Results with other control variables mostly display expected signs but often lack statistical significance. The statistical significance of real GDP per capita is lost in columns (5) and (6) where other control variables are included; columns (5) and (6) are based on reduced sample size because of a lack of data for all the control variables for all countries. The Asia variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in columns (5) and (6), indicating that Asian countries were more inclined to vote against the decoy than European countries. The Oceania dummy variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in column (6); it is not statistically significant in column (5). The other regional dummy variables lack statistical significance. The OECD dummy variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that OECD countries were more supportive of the decoy than non-OECD countries. The Warsaw Pact dummy variable and the legal origin variables are not statistically significant.

Table 6: Regression Results, Ordered Probit, robust standard errors, coefficient estimates

Dependent variable: UNGA votes on the resolutions in table 5

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
POLITY IV – Constraints on Chief Executive	0.3398***		0.2636***		0.1464*	
	[5.12]		[4.22]		[1.76]	
Democracy-Dictatorship		1.1153***		0.8347***		0.6812**
		[5.38]		[3.85]		[2.41]
log GDP per capita			0.2506***	0.2405***	0.0539	0.0709
			[3.01]	[3.10]	[0.37]	[0.49]
Africa					0.1636	0.3265
					[0.30]	[0.58]
Asia					-0.8723*	-0.8532*
					[1.71]	[1.79]
America					0.0545	-0.1857
					[0.10]	[0.34]
Oceania					0.7808	1.6854**
					[1.17]	[2.46]
OECD					1.4252***	1.4238***
					[2.63]	[2.62]
Warsaw Pact					0.8514	0.8671
					[1.50]	[1.57]
Legal origin (British)					0.2422	0.1022
					[0.74]	[0.33]
Legal origin (German)					0.1594	0.1434
					[0.26]	[0.24]
Legal origin (Scandinavian)					0.6243	0.6208
					[1.00]	[0.98]
Legal origin (Socialist)					-0.1115	-0.0884
					[0.34]	[0.30]
Observations	148	175	146	169	143	165
Pseudo R-squared	0.13	0.09	0.16	0.12	0.31	0.33

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level

Table 7 shows the marginal effects (the change in the voting probability when the democracy indicators change) for the estimates in table 6. Using the Chief-in-Executive measure, an entirely democratic country was some 62 percentage points more likely to vote in support of the decoy than an entirely

autocratic country.²⁵ Using the Democracy-Dictatorship dummy, the probability of a democracy voting against the decoy is some 36 percentage points less than that of an autocracy. With income included, an entirely democratic country was some 48 percentage points more likely to vote in favor of the decoy than an entirely autocratic country.²⁶ A change from Dictatorship to Democracy decreases the probability of voting against the decoy by around 26 percentage points. The marginal effects for the full model are smaller for the dichotomous Democracy-Dictatorship measure but remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level.²⁷ An entirely democratic country

²⁵ The results in column (1), first cell (only democracy variable included) indicate that, when the Chief-in-Executive variable increases by one point (on a scale from 1 to 7), the probability of voting against the decoy decreases by about 10.4 percentage points.

²⁶ The results (column (1), third cell) show that, when the Chief-in-Executive variable increases by one point (on a scale from 1 to 7), the probability of voting against the decoy decreases by 7.9 percentage points.

²⁷ The marginal effects for the Chief in Executive variable in the last row of Table 7 are statistically significant at the 10% level in the first and second cell and just lack statistical significance at the 10% level in the third cell. The lack of data may well explain why the democracy-induced effects are weaker for the Chief in Executive variable than for the Democracy-Dictatorship variable. The Chief in Executive variable is not available for Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Iraq, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

was 9 to 32 percentage points more likely to abstain (column 2) and 7 to 30 percentage points more likely to vote to support the decoy (column 3) than an entirely autocratic country.

Table 7: Marginal effects (at observed values in the sample), ordered probit

		(1)	(2)	(3)
Variable		Country voted in favor of the resolution	Country abstained	Country voted against the resolution
Only democracy variable included	POLITY IV – Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.104*** [6.95]	0.054*** [6.25]	0.050*** [3.65]
	Democracy	-0.363*** [6.74]	0.183*** [6.68]	0.181*** [3.84]
	POLITY IV – Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.079*** [5.16]	0.041*** [4.71]	0.037*** [3.41]
GDP included	Democracy	-0.264*** [4.33]	0.135*** [4.41]	0.129*** [3.12]
	POLITY IV – Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.035* [1.72]	0.019* [1.78]	0.016 [1.57]
Full model	Democracy	-0.154** [2.33]	0.085** [2.49]	0.070** [2.01]

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level

Table 8 shows the regression results for voting on the second resolution in table 5. Both measures of democracy are statistically significant at the 1 percent level – as shown in columns (1) to (6).

Table 8: Regression results, ordered Probit, robust standard errors, coefficient estimates

Dependent variable: UNGA vote on resolution 64/91 20091210

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
POLITY IV – Constraints on Chief Executive	0.4860***		0.4138***		0.3105***	
	[6.14]		[5.51]		[3.35]	
Democracy-Dictatorship		1.3937***		1.1629***		0.9349***
		[6.33]		[4.95]		[3.07]
log GDP per capita			0.3712***	0.3261***	0.2111	0.2253
			[3.67]	[3.86]	[1.32]	[1.51]
Africa					-0.3216	-0.4204
					[0.60]	[0.78]
Asia					-0.3694	-0.7454*
					[0.83]	[1.81]
America					0.3069	-0.3492
					[0.66]	[0.76]
Oceania					10.079	1.6851***
					[1.46]	[2.88]
OECD					0.8101	0.7201
					[1.61]	[1.49]
Warsaw Pact					0.1839	-0.1891
					[0.60]	[0.61]
Legal origin (British)					-0.028	-0.2223
					[0.08]	[0.74]
Legal origin (German)					0.0683	0.1068
					[0.21]	[0.35]
Legal origin (Scandinavian)					0.5134	0.6167
					[1.26]	[1.59]
Legal origin (Socialist)					-0.1431	-0.2729
					[0.69]	[1.51]
Observations	145	174	143	168	140	164
Pseudo R-squared	0.26	0.15	0.31	0.19	0.37	0.34

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at the 10 percent level; **

significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level

Table 9: Marginal effects (at observed values in the sample), ordered probit,
UNGA vote on resolution 64/91 20091210.

		(1)	(2)	(3)
Variable		Country voted in favor of the resolution	Country abstained	Country voted against the resolution
Only democracy variable included	POLITY IV - Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.134*** [13.32]	0.101*** [8.39]	0.033*** [2.59]
	Democracy	-0.451*** [10.29]	0.318*** [8.50]	0.133*** [3.25]
GDP included	POLITY IV - Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.104*** [9.25]	0.079*** [6.82]	0.026*** [2.65]
	Democracy	-0.355*** [6.46]	0.257*** [6.10]	0.097*** [2.91]
Full model	POLITY IV - Constraints on Chief Executive	-0.072*** [3.72]	0.052*** [3.96]	0.019** [2.19]
	Democracy	-0.233*** [3.06]	0.170*** [3.17]	0.062** [2.28]

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at the 10 percent level; **

significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level

Table 9 shows that the marginal effects are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level whether a government voted against the decoy, abstained, or voted in support of the decoy. Based on the Chief in Executive measure, an entirely democratic country was some 80 percentage points less likely to vote against the decoy than an entirely autocratic country.²⁸ Using the

²⁸ The results in column (1), first cell (only democracy variable included), show that when the Chief in Executive variable increases by one point (on the scale from 1 to 7), the probability of voting against the decoy decreases by about 13.4 percentage points.

dichotomous measure, the probability of a democracy voting against the decoy was some 45 percentage points less than that of an autocracy.

With income included, when the Chief in Executive variable increases by one point (on a scale from 1 to 7), the probability of voting against the decoy decreases by 10.4 percentage points (table 8 in column (1), third cell). An entirely democratic country was therefore some 62 percentage points less likely to vote against the decoy than an entirely autocratic country. With the dichotomous measure, the probability of a democracy voting against the decoy decreases by around 36 percentage points. The marginal effects for the full model (the last row of table 9) are somewhat smaller for both democracy measures but remain statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level.

As in the first exceptional vote, democracies in the second vote were more likely than autocracies to support the decoy and were more likely to abstain. The likelihood of a democracy voting in support of the decoy was 6 to 20 percentage points greater than that of an autocracy and the likelihood of a democracy abstaining was 17 to 60 percentage points greater.

8.2 Robustness checks

Abstention might be regarded as an expression of disfavor with the resolutions. We therefore estimated a common probit model with robust standard errors interpreting abstentions as votes against the resolutions. The results, available on request, leave unchanged the inferences regarding the influence of the democracy variables on voting. There is a possibility that our

estimates are subject to omitted-variable bias because Muslim-majority countries tend both to vote in favor of resolutions criticizing Israel and also to have autocratic government (Borooah and Paldam, 2007; Potrafke, 2012). Inclusion of a Muslim variable does not change the inferences with respect to the democracy variables nor do marginal effects qualitatively change.²⁹ We conducted other robustness tests involving corruption and oil production. No indications suggest that the results identifying differences in voting based on a country being a democracy or autocracy are not robust.

9. Continuation of supermajorities

After the resolutions in which democracies have been shown to atypically defect, the usual supermajorities return. We may ask about the sources for the many decoy resolutions. Actions by the decoy are not required for new resolutions. Decoy resolutions are standardly repeated verbatim every year. We can therefore compare voting on the representative supermajority decoy resolutions in table 3 with votes on the same resolutions in 2010. Table 10 shows the 2010 voting outcomes for the repetition of the resolutions in 2009 in table 3. There is little difference in how individual governments voted. The correlation coefficient for voting by countries in tables 3 and 10 is 0.94. The

²⁹ We used the data of Alesina et al. (2003). The database distinguishes “Shia Muslim” and “Sunni Muslim” for some countries and for other countries this distinction is not recorded. We combined the data to obtain a single measure of the share of Muslims in a country’s population.

defection by governments of democracies was therefore transitory and the exceptionality based on comparison with prior resolutions applies as well to subsequent voting behavior.

Table 10: Voting outcomes in 2010 for the representative resolutions in table 3

UN vote	Against	Abstain	In favor	Not voting	Subject
A/RES/65/103 20101210	6	2	169	15	Applicability of the Geneva Convention
A/RES/65/105 20101210	9	2	165	16	Practices by Israel affecting human rights
A/RES/65/179 20101220	8	5	167	12	Limitations on Israel's borders and sovereignty

Source: United Nations

10. The Goldstone Report and Goldstone Retraction

The voting record thus reveals atypical defections by democracies from usual extended logrolling in decoy voting. The circumstances underlying the defections provide a case study of decoy voting. The two resolutions in which the defections occurred both concern the United Nations' Goldstone Report. The Report accused the decoy of human-rights violations, including in this case intentional targeting of civilians in warfare.³⁰

³⁰ Beginning in late December 2008 and continuing into early 2009, the defense forces of Israel entered Hamas-governed Gaza with the objective of ending missile attacks on Israel's civilian population. In May 2009 a UN committee headed by South

Reports and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly usually do not receive wide media attention. The Goldstone Report received, in contrast, inordinate media attention.³¹

There is evidence, supported by theory of profit-maximizing behavior, of media bias in reporting of news (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). Readers and viewers choose the media sources that are consistent with their priors or with what they want to believe. The media maximizes profits by targeting an audience and catering to the targeted audience's particular priors or beliefs.

There are diverse priors and beliefs regarding the decoy. There was, however, exceptional uniformity in opposition expressed in the western media to the accusations made against the decoy in the Goldstone Report. There was acknowledgement that the purpose of the Goldstone Report was to set the grounds for decoy voting.³² It was noted that, contrary to the

African judge Richard Goldstone was directed to provide a report on the conflict. The Goldstone Report was presented in September 2009. The first vote in table 5 took place on November 5 2009 and the second vote on December 10 2009. For the Goldstone Report, see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm>.

³¹ An internet search on "Goldstone Report" (August 27 2012) revealed over 4 million results.

³² For example: "It was to be expected that the usual suspects...would be eager to condemn (the decoy) for war crimes in defending itself.. Anything to divert attention from their own atrocities... the fig leaf for being scared of dictators...is the report by

accusations that the decoy had intentionally targeted civilians, it was decoy's civilians that had been intentionally targeted.³³ The Goldstone Report was also described as making "a mockery of impartiality with its judgment of facts"³⁴ and as "undermining faith in international law".³⁵

In April 2011, the principal author of the Goldstone Report, Judge Richard Goldstone, issued a retraction. The retraction acknowledged that the decoy did not behave as accused and that "civilians were not intentionally targeted" by the decoy. The retraction stated that the decoy:

*"like any other sovereign nation, has the right and obligation to defend itself and its citizens against attacks from abroad and within."*³⁶

The phrase "like any other sovereign nation" in the Goldstone retraction identifies the self-interest in defection by democracies. Decoy resolutions focus specifically on the decoy in criticizing acts of self-defense, as did the

the South African judge Richard Goldstone". Harold Evans, *The Guardian* (20 October 2009).

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/20/israel-goldstone-palestine-gaza-un>

³³ Jeffrey White, "Resistance and rockets: Hamas targeting of Israeli civilians" (February 25, 2010) <http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3179>.

³⁴ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/14/AR2009111402279_pf.html.

³⁵ The (Ed Morgan, *The Toronto Star*, 22 October 2009) <http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/713921>.

³⁶ http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html.

Goldstone Report.³⁷ The Goldstone Report was exceptional in extending the domain of criticism in principle to any government's defense of its population against state-supported terror – which was contrary to the self-interest of governments of democracies.³⁸ Democracies therefore voted expressively on the non-binding Goldstone resolutions, to express their dissatisfaction with the generality of applicability of constraints on self-defense. The Goldstone retraction did not change the Goldstone resolutions, which remain on the UN record. The Goldstone resolutions and the retraction provide a case study of decoy voting, ironically because decoy voting was unsuccessful in attracting the usual supermajorities.

11. Implications

11.1 Political institutions and UN behavior of governments

The United Nations General Assembly is a global forum in which the world's governments are represented and vote. The governments include in various degrees autocracies and democracies. It is of interest to study the effect of

³⁷ Evans (ibid) points to the criticism of self-defense in the Goldstone Report: “The terms of reference (of the Goldstone Report) validate the torment of Israeli civilians. Hamas launched 7,000 rockets – every one intended to kill as many people as possible – then contemptuously dismissed repeated warnings from Israel to stop or face the consequences.”

³⁸ Article 51 of the United Nations Charter grants countries the right of self-defense, but excludes the right of self-defense defense against terror. The exclusion includes state-supported terror. See Byman (2005).

different political institutions on behavior of governments, in particular since autocratic governments do not allow free voting and free speech domestically but vote and engage in rhetoric in the United Nations.

11.2 Moral force or self-interest

The focus on one country in the non-binding UN resolutions would be of analytical or theoretical interest only as an instance of the theory of expressive voting, if all benefits and costs involved in UN voting were solely expressive. Actual behavior could be affected by the non-binding UN resolutions if the moral-force or moral-suasion argument applied. Our theory of UN voting is based on self-interest (both expressive and material) rather than ethical response to the protestations of others. Autocratic governments have self-interest in logrolling and in decoy voting. Governments of democracies have self-interest in joining autocracies in decoy voting. Self-interest also underlies the exceptional defection from decoy voting.

11.3 International institutions and development objectives

Article I of the United Nations Charter states the objectives of “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all” (United Nations, 2005). The other Bretons Woods institutions, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, have more particular development objectives.³⁹ Efforts to achieve the development objectives through project aid

³⁹ The mandate of the International Monetary Fund is broader.

and concessionary lending have overall been ineffective (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008, 2011).⁴⁰ A substantial literature – including Easterly (2001), Abed and Gupta (2002), Boockmann and Dreher (2003), Dichter (2003), Teunissen and Akkerman (2005), and Hillman (2007) – finds impediments to development due to behavior of autocratic government in recipient countries. Our study shows that the same governments that impede achievement of the development objectives of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are beyond criticism in the United Nations, where, if not moral suasion, expressive loss of face among peers could discipline the governments' behavior.⁴¹

⁴⁰ In further evidence, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) find that aid does not promote more democratic institutions, even when more democratic institutions are part of the conditionality of the aid. Dreher and Gassebner (2012) find that lending by the World Bank contributes to crises in recipient countries. In a study of benefits of Security Council membership, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find that donors allocate aid strategically to recipient governments without regard for the effectiveness of aid in achieving development objectives.

⁴¹ We have taken for granted that autocracy impedes development. Freedom is in general a requisite of successful economic development – see Sen (1999), De Haan, Lundström, and Sturm (2006), Besley and Persson (2011). Autocracies disallow political freedom. Economic freedom would allow accumulation of wealth by individuals or groups that could threaten the regime (Hillman, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Apart from exceptions in East Asia (Paldam, 2003), political and economic freedom occur together: see de Haan and Sturm (2003), Norton and Gwartney (2008), Persson and Tabellini (2009), and Benyishay and Betancourt (2010). The unfavorable aspects of life under autocratic government include absence of the rule of law (Hillman, 2004; North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009); inferior human-

11.4 Unidimensionality in UN General Assembly voting

Unidimensionality has been observed in voting in the United Nations General Assembly, with governments distinguishable as either voting with or against the United States (Voeten, 2000). Within the unidimensionality, Dreher and Jensen (2013) find that changes in leadership of governments tend to be accompanied by a change to voting with the United States. With the exceptions of Boockmann and Dreher (2011) and Hug (2013), studies of UN voting have investigated how governments vote but have not considered the content of the resolutions on which voting takes place. The unidimensionality is evident in decoy voting that forms a substantial part of the UN voting record.

11.5 Global government

Inclusive global representation makes the United Nations General Assembly a first approximation to global government. The benefits proposed from global

development indicators, with low life expectancy (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006), high infant mortality (Kudamatsu, 2012); and inadequate health care (Klomp and de Haan 2008; Justesen, 2012); absent or limited educational opportunities for the non-elite population (Castelló-Climent 2008); and exploitation of labor (Kim and Ghandi 2010). People emigrate from but do not generally move to countries under autocratic government (Epstein, Hillman, and Ursprung, 1999).

government are direct resolution of global externalities and provision of global public goods (Kaul et al., 1999; Tanzi 2008, 2009). Countering disadvantages have been noted because of the extra layer of bureaucracy that would be created by global government (Vaubel, 2006, 2009). Other studies point to principal-agent problems within the United Nations bureaucracy (Heaton, 2005; Hsieh and Moretti, 2006) and find evidence of opportunistic behavior specific to representatives of autocracies (Fisman and Miguel, 2007). Other evidence shows disregard of autocratic governments for the environment (Congleton, 1992; Farzin and Bond; 2006); Bernauer and Koubi, 2009). Our study adds to evidence on the likely ethos of global government.

Postscript: Alternative explanations

Alternatives can be proposed for decoy voting as the explanation for the focus on one country in the United Nations General Assembly voting record. One alternative is the claim that the decoy is not a decoy but merits the focus of attention. Such a claim would attribute to the decoy the same world share of human-rights violations and other unbecoming behavior as the decoy's share in UN resolutions that name a country. The decoy would thus have to be accepted as responsible for between two-thirds and three-quarters of all acts deserving disapproval in United Nations resolutions in the two decades from 1990. Comparators suggest that such a conclusion is objectively not warranted. Because the same decoy resolutions are repeated year after year, the decoy does not need to be shown as doing anything new to be censured.

Only resolutions naming the decoy are standardly repeated over time. The claim that the decoy is not a decoy requires, as an accompaniment, explanation for the consistent refusal of the United States and usually Australia and Canada and some other countries, not to participate in decoy voting to censure the decoy. Either the decoy must have captured the votes of these countries or these countries refuse consistently to vote to censure a country that – if the counterhypothesis is valid – is responsible for the vast majority of the world’s unbecoming acts. Our model of motives for voting proposes that some countries will not vote against the decoy because of expressive aversion to supporting decoy voting.

A second alternative to our theory of decoy voting is that the focus of attention on the decoy is a continuation of historical prejudice. It would not change our conclusions if the motive for voting to accuse the decoy were prejudice. The decoy would still be a decoy. We note that populations in many countries whose governments benefit directly from decoy voting do not have a history that includes prejudice against the decoy.

The alternative proposals take us in directions that we do not believe are not useful or not required for explaining the UN voting record. Both alternatives involve a role for prejudice. Our explanation of voting behavior rests on self-interest rather than on prejudicial preferences (on such preferences, see Becker, 1957).

The alternative explanations are specific to the identity of the decoy. Our theory of decoy voting does not depend on the identity of the decoy. The

decoy is but an instrument. Our predictions and conclusions would apply just as well if the data were to reveal another decoy or if the decoy were to change.⁴²

In not being concerned with the identity of the decoy, we have correspondingly not been concerned with the attributes or the welfare of the decoy.⁴³ Importantly, our conclusions are independent of whether all or some claims against the decoy are fabricated or true – although decoy voting does provide a motive for fabrication. Our purpose has been to show generically, and not with regard to the particular identity of a decoy, the incentives for and consequences of decoy voting in the United Nations.⁴⁴

⁴² Our model of UN voting predicts choice of the decoy according to supermajorities obtainable from support of governments outside the autocratic logrolling bloc. The alternative decoy would be revealed by the data. We do not name alternative decoys because of the counterfactual nature of alternatives. Predictions for alternative decoys are available on request.

⁴³ The welfare of the decoy does not seem to have been adversely affected by decoy voting. See Senor and Singer (2009).

⁴⁴ Yet discussants and commentators on our study have remarkably often been preoccupied with the specific identity of the revealed decoy.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Voting on the representative benchmark resolutions in 2009 (table 3)

Resolution 92 of the 64th session of the general assembly of the United Nations

Countries that voted against (6):

Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, United States

Abstentions (4):

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Vanuatu.

In favor (168):

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Absent (14):

Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Haiti, Kiribati, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tuvalu, Uganda

Resolution 94 of the 64th session of the general assembly of the United Nations

Countries that voted against (9):

Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Panama, United States

Abstentions (5):

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Liberia, Vanuatu

In favor (162):

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Absent (16):

Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Haiti, Kiribati, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uganda.

Resolution 185 of the 64th session of the general assembly of the United Nations

Countries that voted against (8):

Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, United States

Abstentions (7):

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Tuvalu.

In favor (165):

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Absent (12):

Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Honduras, Kiribati, Liberia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Vanuatu.

Appendix II: Voting by governments on the Goldstone resolutions (table 5)
Resolution L.10 of the 64th session of the general assembly of the United Nations
(the Goldstone Report)

Countries that voted against (18):

Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Netherlands, Palau, Panama, Poland, Slovakia, Macedonia, Ukraine, United States

Abstentions (44):

Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Tonga, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay.

In favor (114):

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Countries absent (16):

Bhutan, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Togo, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Resolution 91 of the 64th session of the general assembly of the United Nations

Countries that voted against (9):

Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Panama, United States

Abstentions (74):

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu.

In favor (92):

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Countries absent (17):

Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Haiti, Kiribati, Madagascar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tuvalu, Uganda

Appendix III: Voting by governments on the representative benchmark resolutions in 2010 (table 3A)

Resolution 179 of the 65th session of the general assembly of the United Nations

Countries that voted against:

Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, United States

Abstentions:

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Papua New Guinea, Tonga

In favor:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Absent:

Bhutan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Panama, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis.

Resolution 103 of the 65th session of the general assembly of the United Nations

Countries that voted against:

Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, United States

Abstentions:

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire

In favor:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Absent:

Antigua and Barbuda, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Suriname, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu

Resolution 105 of the 65th session of the general assembly of the United Nations:

Countries that voted against:

Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Panama, United States

Abstentions:

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire

In favor:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Countries absent:

Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tonga, Vanuatu