The University of British Columbia
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Guide:

Political Lobbying in a Recurring Environment

We examine coordination in private provision of public goods when agents' contributions are complementary. When complementarity is sufficiently high an additional full-contribution equilibrium emerges. We experimentally investigate subjects' behavior using a between-subject design that varies complementarity. When two equilibria exist, subjects coordinate on the full-contribution equilibrium. When complementarity is sizable but only a zero-contribution equilibrium exists, subjects persistently contribute above it. Choice and non-choice data reveal heterogeneity among subjects and two distinct types. Homo pecuniarius maximizes profits by best-responding to beliefs, while Homo behavioralis identifies this strategy but chooses to deviate from it - sacrificing pecuniary rewards to support altruism or competitiveness.

http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/schools/economics/about/Pages/seminars.aspx