An important goal for firms is for information about their offerings to spread quickly via social interactions (e.g., word of mouth). Although so-called fast information diffusion can be difficult to achieve, prior research has shown that it is more likely when people with high degrees of social connectivity transmit information. This paper tests an approach for getting information to higher-connectivity people whereby firms target information at “normal” people who are incentivized to pass it on to their higher-connectivity friends. These people act as the firm’s informal agents whose information-transmitting behaviors need to be aligned with the firm’s fast diffusion goal. A simulation and six experiments test a coordination mechanism based on positive information externalities that are either created through explicit incentives or made salient if already present in the case of network goods. Compared to no-externality incentives, this mechanism increases the likelihood of agents transmitting information to their higher-connectivity friends, which in turn makes aggregate-level fast information diffusion more likely.