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Author(s): Lior Barshack
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The Sovereignty of Pleasure

SEXUAL AND POLITICAL FREEDOM IN THE OPERAS
OF MOZART AND DA PONTE

Lior Barshack

Abstract. In a fragment on Mozart, Adorno suggested that under the old regime the humanity and sovereignty of the aristocracy were bound up with aristocratic libertinism. In Mozart’s time, Adorno noted, the bourgeoisie acquired sovereignty and humanity through the imitation of aristocratic libertinism. The view of sexuality as a source of humanity and freedom is implicit in Mozart’s works themselves, particularly in the operas written in collaboration with Da Ponte. However, Mozart was a libertine in a very mild and qualified sense. For him, humanity does not consist in the quest for pleasure but in the permanent confrontation with the contradictory claims of the enduring and the ephemeral, the inward and the outward. Humanity and freedom depend on enduring relations much as they are fostered by the pursuit of pleasure. Both poles of human desire seem to enhance individual autonomy vis-à-vis the social body. This essay sketches a view of the individuating and humanizing power of sexuality which finds an illustration in the radiant individuality of Mozart’s characters.

Keywords: Mozart, libertinism, opera, sovereignty, freedom, Adorno

One of the generally ignored details in the libretto of Don Giovanni is the entry of the officers of the court, the ministri di giustizia, in the finale, among the ensemble of the Don’s victims. Their presence is indicated in the stage directions: they do not participate in the ensemble nor is their existence acknowledged by it, and they are often omitted from both text and stage. They have been called by Don Ottavio to bring Don Giovanni to justice. As with the arrival of representatives of the law in the finale of The Barber of Seville, the
emergence of the *ministri di giustizia* is a farce. Since theatre and litigation are, in Victor Turner’s words, two analogous “means of redress” through which society resolves normative crises, the theatrical representation of the judicial instance produces an uncanny effect of redundancy.¹ As the officers of the court briskly enter the scene in the finales of *Don Giovanni* and *The Barber of Seville*, a resolution had already taken place.

The failure of the officers of the court to restore order conveys a view of the law which is hinted at also in *Le nozze di Figaro* and *Così fan tutte*. Following an age-old satirical tradition, Mozart and Da Ponte mock legal language and the representatives of the legal world. The notaries in *Figaro* (Bartolo, acting as Marcelina’s advocate, and Don Curzio) and in *Così* (Despina in disguise) are mean and petty characters. Bartolo’s frenzied eulogy for vendetta—the ultimate vice in Mozart’s operas—portrays law as a means of revenge, providing a conclusive illustration of Nietzsche’s theory of *ressentiment*. In *Figaro*, law and social convention are invariably exhibited as instruments of revenge in the service of the sexually discontented: the Count, Bartolo, and Basilio. The Count is unlikable only because he insists on holding fast to his rights: he is too possessive of the countess, refuses to forgive when asked to, and hesitates to renounce the seigniorial *ius primae noctis*.

I. NATURALISM AND THE IMMANENCE OF THE POWER TO PARDON

The mockery of law fits into a point of view which animates the three operas, however generally and unobtrusively. *Le nozze di Figaro*, *Don Giovanni*, and *Così fan tutte* stand next to each other like panels of a triptych: they unfold a common worldview while differing in emphasis. The collaboration between Mozart and Da Ponte produced a singular moment in the history of theater not only because of the quality of Mozart’s music but also because of the social comment and psychological insighttreasured in the scores. The provocative title of Hoquard’s seminal work, *La pensée de Mozart*, is fully born out by its author’s meticulous unpacking of the wealth of social and psychological observations Mozart translated into music.² In the absence of external evidence, the works themselves bear witness to the exuberance of Mozart’s response to the outlook and attitude which Da Ponte embodied, and which may be regarded as typically (or stereotypically) Venetian. But the underlying
worldview of the operas emanated primarily from Mozart’s own beliefs and
preoccupations. As Moberly has shown, Mozart’s contribution to the structure
and spirit of the libretti was at least as substantial as Da Ponte’s.¹

At the core of Mozart’s outlook stands a view of social life and institutions
as anchored in nature. To many of his contemporaries, naturalism provided a
theoretical foundation for a critique of traditional institutions, a mild version
of which can be found in the operas. Pastoral provided Mozart and Da Ponte
with a literary model.² Naturalism did not lead Mozart to a sweeping repudia-
tion of traditional institutions, since he regarded these as essentially grounded
in nature. It did imply a measure of laxity in sexual morality and flexibility in
arbitrating the perennial conflict between the claims of love and the anonym-
ity and transience of the sensuous. This intimate disputation, which Mozart’s
music never tires of probing, was perceived by him as the ultimate and indelible
source of action in the theatre of nature.

While modernizing pastoral, Mozart and Da Ponte were committed to its
basic premises. First, there is the view of society and culture as embedded in
nature.³ Humans are ruled by the powers of nature, allegorized by the pagan
gods and goddesses that are invoked in the three operas. Second, Mozart and
Da Ponte depict the natural/human order as peaceful enough to render legal
regulation unnecessary. As Etting writes in his survey of pastoral motifs and
ideas, “though tightly knit, pastoral society is loosely organized. It may be
inherently well ordered, but it is hardly governed.”⁴ The rule of nature mar-
ginalizes positive law and social convention. In fidelity to pastoral precedents
rather than natural law jurisprudence or theology, Da Ponte refers to the gov-
ernment of nature as the law of nature.⁵ In Così, Despina speaks of the law of
nature governing love and Don Alfonso concludes that “nature cannot make
exceptions.”

Mozart’s interest in nature also assumed less literary forms, which did not
fail to draw the attention of modern critics and biographers. His correspon-
dence abounds with references to any conceivable function of the human (and
animal) body. Maynard Solomon discussed Mozart’s preoccupation with
bodily matters and lewd metaphors in a chapter on the “carnivalesque dimen-
sion” in Mozart’s personality and art. Solomon incisively describes Mozart’s
repeated indignation at abuses of power on the part of the nobility. Mozart’s
“radical energies,” Solomon suggests, found an outlet in the egalitarianism
and inclusiveness of the carnival. Nothing and nobody is excluded from the
carnival. The hierarchies and distinctions laid down by religion, morality, law
and etiquette are abolished. Solomon writes: “Mozart’s obscene riddles, his penchant for the bawdy in general, emerge within a space formed by the carnival’s multiple nullifications—of time, actuality, rationality, law and logic.”

The difficulty with Solomon’s reference to the carnivalesque dimension is that it implies the existence of a non-carnivalesque dimension in Mozart’s world. For Mozart, however, the naturalism and egalitarianism of the carnival were not confined to particular moments or spheres of life. They were permanent and all-inclusive. Historically, Mozart’s work attests to the processes by which the liberties of the carnival were transformed into permanent moral freedom.

Mozart’s point of view was further marked by an intuitive confidence in natural abundance. Mozart identified with Don Giovanni’s absorption in the sheer magnitude of supply—of women, wine, entertainment—and with the Don’s careless squandering. His prodigality and bold career decisions may have derived from an underlying belief in worldly plenitude. Abundance for Mozart did not amount to the attainment of an ultimate object, to an all-embracing experience or to any other form of satiation. He found in nature an intransigent diversity which comprises tensions and antagonisms, an interminable spectacle of ever new temptations, possibilities, variations. Diversity implies a state of excitation, which in various phases of psychoanalytic theory was regarded as quite inimical to pleasure. Freud’s belated admission that the pleasure principle does not seek the reduction of excitation would have certainly won Mozart’s approval.

Marcuse saw that the tensions between the pleasure principle and the reality principle subside under conditions of abundance. The operas of Mozart and Da Ponte unravel the details of this reconciliation. But while according to Marcuse the reconciliation of the reality and pleasure principles in a state of abundance occurs under the auspices of the Nirvana principle, Mozart conceives of abundance as a condition of ceaseless surprise and misadventure, rather than one of nirvana.

The diversity and restlessness of Mozart’s world shaped his style as an artist. Levi-Strauss’s claim that music denies time by resolving and dissolving oppositions is qualified, if not contradicted, by the celebration of difference, ambiguity and open-endedness in Mozart’s operas. For over two hundred years commentators on Mozart’s music repeatedly pointed to the persistence of ambiguity and the deflection of any movement toward oneness as its defining characteristics. The celebration of difference and contrast—between moods, characters, inner voices, or between word and music—conveys a view
of society as the arena of plural and discordant voices. In the preface to the printed libretto of Figaro, Da Ponte champions plurality in Mozart’s name and his own:

In spite of all this study, diligence, and care taken by the composer and by me to be brief, the opera will still not be the shortest one ever put on in our theater, for which we hope that excuse enough will be found in the variety of threads with which the action of this drama is woven, the vastness and greatness of the same, and the multiplicity of musical numbers that had to be made . . . to express step by step with diverse colors the diverse passions that rival each other. . . .

Moments of convincing resolution cannot be found in the three operas. Musical resolutions are often subverted by the resurgence of dramatic discord, and vice versa. The faultless architecture of the ensembles only accentuates the persistence of personal and social divides. When a certain compromise seems to be established, the seeds of rupture are sown. The most obvious examples among many others are the finales. It has been often noted that the vows of reconciliation in the finales of Figaro and Così are hardly credible. On and off stage, everybody knows that the whims of nature will stir turmoil tomorrow as they have done today. Nor is equilibrium reached at the end of Don Giovanni. The Don’s descent dooms his vengeful victims, including the future couples, to futility and isolation.

The heightened drama of some of the later piano concertos and symphonies does not compromise Mozart’s fidelity to the reality principle and hence to worldly diversity. These and other works of Mozart’s later years introduce an emotional turmoil which disposed commentators to apply concepts that are typically associated with romantic music. Mozart’s resort to sharp melodic, harmonic and rhythmic irregularities, sinister chromaticism, and outbursts of polyphonic density invited references to the wistful and the mystical. While according to Solomon Mozart stages a confrontation between order and disorder, the familiar and the radically alien, it seems to me that Mozart attempts to integrate and contain the erratic within the here and now. His outlook is monistic; it does not recognize a fundamental dichotomy between order and disorder. Affective intensity does not result in a retreat from the play of variations and ambiguities which make up everyday existence. It does not evoke a mythical past, a utopian future, or an abstract overview of the present. In the height of passion, Mozart often invokes the frivolous and the commonplace. If the passions are conveyed
with almost breathless compression, their mundane circumstances, their incidental causes and outcomes, are never forgotten.

In the three operas, the protagonists profess incomprehension of their desires. They perceive desire as an alien force that is about to invade the human, moral order. In *Così*, the Albanian origin of the two competitors of Guglielmo and Ferrando represents the externality of the sensuous to the established order of society—Despina mistakes the two men for Turks, the enemies of civilization against whom Ferrando and Guglielmo have left to fight. In the three operas, masquerading unveils the masqueraders’ own alienation from their true desires. However, for Mozart and Da Ponte, the incompatible urges that their protagonists are surprised to discover in themselves and in each other reside firmly within the human order. Adorno’s comments on Mozart’s music connote confidence in the capacity of order to contain disorder:

By juxtaposing relatively disjointed or contrasting elements, Mozart, the composer who is praised above all others for the rigor of his form, masterfully juggles the concept of form itself. He is so sure of its strength that he effectively lets go the reins and, on the basis of the security of the construction itself, gives the lead to centrifugal forces.

If freedom is integral to a social order that is grounded in nature, it does not need a revolution in order to be materialized. Mozart was neither a sexual utopian nor a revolutionary of lesser ambitions. There may be room for progress and enlightenment but these will not radically alter the human condition. Mozart’s stance can be understood by analogy to the place that he occupies in the history of music, the place of an ultimate manipulator of existing structures—as Adorno portrays him in the above quotation from *Aesthetic Theory*—rather than a revolutionary. For Mozart the pastoral set-up does not lie outside historical time, in the mythical, utopian realm of a pre-historical past or a post-historical future. Abundance is not an a-historical condition. Mozart’s and Da Ponte’s reworking of pastoral unveils the naturalness of human existence within history. The garden in the final act of *Figaro* is not an imaginary place, as several interpreters took it to be. Cherubino is an allegorical figure, a modern Amor, but also a masterfully crafted real adolescent. The naïveté, in Schiller’s sense, which Isaiah Berlin attributed to Verdi is more clearly characteristic of Mozart.

Mozart’s endorsement of the existing order involved the affirmation of its traditional institutions, such as the obligations of monogamy and deference to
paternal authority. To Mozart, these institutions did not belong to a realm of culture, religion, and history that is alienated from nature. The obligations that tie family members were seen by him as natural rather than conventional, and as doomed to perpetual competition with the other, more whimsical, imperatives of nature. They had nothing to do with the negativity which, following Kant and Hegel or following Freud, we have come to ascribe to the law and, more broadly, to the constitution of the human. These obligations do not stem from hatred or depreciation of the immediate and the sensuous, and do not pave the way to higher levels of existence and knowledge—such a lofty view of monogamy may be found in *The Abduction from the Seraglio* and *The Magic Flute*, but not in the Da Ponte operas.\(^1\) Long relationships are as spontaneous and undialectical as the pursuit of sensuous pleasure, and form part of Eros’ armoury alongside more ephemeral distractions.

Marriage may be legally and religiously registered and regulated, but its origin and essence lie in the realm of nature. The marriage of Masetto and Zerlina and the anticipated marriage of Figaro and Susanna suggest such an image of marriage. A different understanding of marriage has been attributed to Mozart by Bernard Williams in his reading of *Cosi*. According to Williams, *Cosi* identifies marriage with convention and deals with the typically romantic theme of conflict between feeling and social expectations.\(^2\) The feelings of Dorabella and Fiordiligi for the Albanian gentlemen are according to Williams deeper than their love for Ferrando and Guglielmo, which is merely grounded in marital conventions. The finale depicts the defeat of deeper feeling by social norms.

Williams’s view of the heroines’ love for the soldiers Ferrando and Guglielmo as superficial and merely conventional is hardly supported by the libretto. *Cosi* portrays marriage as grounded in a deep natural attachment, but one that is exposed to nature’s assaults—for example, to the exotic sensuality represented by the Albanian travelers. The opera tackles the conflict not between feeling and convention but between the *passionate* and the *sensuous*, to follow Irving Singer’s phrasing of a perennial dichotomy.\(^3\) The view of Mozart’s music as characterized by unremitting ambiguity and division can be concretized by reference to the opposition between the sensuous and the passionate. A constant task of Mozart’s music is the accommodation of the passionate and the sensuous, the inward and the outward, the enduring and the ephemeral, in an all-encompassing structure without pacifying the tensions between them. None of the two poles manifests itself to the complete exclusion
of the other—often the listener is unsure as to which of the two is being uttered—and the contest between them is rarely allowed to fade into a calm unity or coexistence. Hesitation and disequilibrium are sustained throughout, in a way that makes Mozart’s perhaps the most subversive of totalizing ideologies among all musical styles.

Williams’s interpretation has to reckon further with the unqualified repudiation of Così in the nineteenth century. Incarnations of the romantic spirit as discrepant as Beethoven and Wagner concurred in their moral condemnation of the opera. Had Mozart’s work dealt with the repression of sentiment by convention, the romantics might have spared it some of the harsh treatment it received. They rejected Così because they denounced the sensuous in the name of the passionate while the opera makes room for both. At some point when romantic conceptions of nature and the passions were already established, Mozart’s playful, jazzy fluctuations between the passionate and the sensuous came to be regarded as the hallmark of artificiality. Among Mozart’s operas, the nineteenth century admired above all Don Giovanni and The Magic Flute.\(^{21}\) Contrary to appearances, Don Giovanni is an opera about the passionate. It tells of a complete devotion to an absent big Other who decrees, and is sought through, sexual promiscuity. In The Magic Flute, the pastoral is represented by Papageno only in order to display the cleavage between humanity and nature. The sensuous and Papageno as its embodiment are banished from the realm of the human. Reason is elevated above nature and marital love unto death above the life of pleasure.

Like the origin of marriage, the justification of paternal authority lies in nature. Paternal authority is not grounded in an otherworldly source, a divinity, ancestral authority, or a moral principle which it is supposed to represent before the young. The authority of the elder emanates from love and its claim to obedience derives from its capacity to guide the young in the pursuit of pleasure. Joseph Kerman noted that in setting to music the “trial scene,” in which Figaro’s identity as the lost son of Bartolo and Marcellina is discovered, Mozart deviated from the spirit of the libretto. While Beaumarchais and Da Ponte draw an irritated Bartolo, Mozart renders him joyous at the revelation.\(^{22}\) Despite the arduous and suffocating relations with his father, Mozart could not find acceptable a different account of father-son relations.

The role of paternal authority is to instruct the young in the ways of the world. In Così—subtitled The School for Lovers—the patriarchal figure, Don Alfonso, is responsible for the initiation of the young into the life of pleasure.
Don Alfonso teaches the young lovers not to sacrifice the diversity of desire’s forms and objects for the sake of the one—a more complex lesson than the latency age morality of the Singspiel. Così ends with a hymn to reason commending forgiveness among lovers for amorous incidents. In Mozart’s operas, forgiveness is not a means for purification or cleansing from sin or guilt, but for the perpetuation of existing relations. Thus, there is never a question of asking and giving forgiveness before the offender is caught with blood on the hands. And then forgiveness is guaranteed, almost trivial. Jealousy among lovers is natural and acceptable but only to the extent that it can be appeased by a half-hearted apology.

Forgiveness is a matter of routine for lovers and for people in positions of authority. The utterly positive nature of paternal authority, its worldly and forward-looking function, is confirmed by the fact that it always forgives. Paternal forgiveness is a familiar theme in Mozart’s operas, occurring in The Abduction from the Seraglio, Idomeneo, La Clemenza di Tito, and The Magic Flute. While punishment is decreed by an impersonal, blind law in the name of the dead—the ancestors, the founding fathers, the mythical lawgivers—the power to forgive belongs to the living. The pardoning power of kings and presidents demonstrates that pardon can be extended and received only by private, individual wills. Unlike other instances of power, the pardoning power declines institutionalization and legal inspection. It cannot vest in the blind and abstract will of the dead, and retains a distinctly personal, vital, and lawless character. A relic of constituent power, unfettered by the authority of the past, the pardoning power constantly challenges the constitutional order and the rule of law.

By giving prominence to paternal forgiveness, Mozart conveys the innerworldly and, in a way, provisional origin of paternal authority. Its role is to transmit the experience and knowledge accumulated by the ancestors, not ancestral law. While such an unprincipled authority may also be compelled to resort to punishment, Mozart’s emphasis on forgiveness prevents paternal authority from developing formal rigor and distance from nature, let alone an otherworldly dimension.

The single exception to the rule of pardon is the condemnation of Don Giovanni. The Commendatore seems to speak in the name of transcendental principles. Through the downfall of Don Giovanni, nature appears to be condemned by the superior authority of law, morality, and religion. Hoquard and Williams offered compelling interpretations of Don Giovanni’s fall which can reconcile it with a naturalist, perhaps even pastoral, reading of the three
operas. For Hoquard, Don Giovanni’s death results from a lethal excess of pleasure, and cannot be explained in terms of moral accountability.\textsuperscript{25} According to Williams, too, the Commendatore does not condemn Don Giovanni in the name of morality or religion.\textsuperscript{26} The Don stands for an excess which nature cannot contain and which eventually consumes itself. Starobinski noted the repeated occurrence of “excess” (eccesso) in the libretto. Contrary to Starobinski’s reading, the term does not signify here a sin that provokes divine punishment.\textsuperscript{27} It denotes an offense to natural measures and proportions. The Don’s conduct is not evil enough to account for his fate in moral terms, but it is sufficiently imprudent.

Don Giovanni’s offense against nature can be understood in different ways. Psychoanalysis allows us to recognize in him an excess of passion which is deeper than the excess of sensuality. Don Giovanni exemplifies the same danger of indulgence in the one that inheres in sexual abstinence out of love of God or in Donna Elvira’s total love for him. The quest for ever new sexual objects conceals an absolute devotion to an absent Other that exacts exclusive loyalty in the form of implacable promiscuity. In \textit{Don Giovanni}, Mozart and Da Ponte expose consistent libertinism as a kind of fundamentalism, as the mirror image of Donna Elvira’s love, and as equally morbid and contrary to nature. For Mozart, as Williams proposed, it is nature herself rather than any transcendent principle which discards the extremities represented by Donna Elvira and Don Giovanni.

\section*{II. FROM SEXUAL TO POLITICAL FREEDOM}

The recognition of the sensuous in the operas of Mozart and Da Ponte has consequences outside the private sphere. The affirmation of undomesticated sexuality in \textit{Le nozze di Figaro} is intertwined with the joy of social and political freedom. The toast \textit{viva la libertá} in the finale of Act I of \textit{Don Giovanni} is deliberately ambivalent as to what type of freedom is concerned.\textsuperscript{28} In the three operas, the passionate and the sensuous are presented as constituents of humanity and freedom generally. More concretely, the democratic import of the operas has been traced to their display of a universalized hedonism. According to Adorno, “The Mozartian ‘divine frivolity’ refers, in terms of the philosophy of history, to the moment when the libertine freedom and sovereignty of the feudal order passed over into that of the bourgeoisie, which,
however, at this stage still resembled the feudal. . . . Humaneness still coincides here with libertinism.”29 Irving Singer writes:

Napoleon cited Beaumarchais’s play as one of the major causes of the French Revolution. In its own way, Mozart’s opera may have been equally subversive. In both the play and the opera, the action consists in the democratization of the sensuous. What formerly belonged to the aristocracy—a sporting attitude towards sex—now belongs to everyone. . . . By striking at the sexual authority, the male seducer who also runs the state, Mozart’s music relentlessly—just think of the continuous pitter-patter of the orchestra in every scene—eats away at the social order, like an ocean endlessly gnawing at the shore.30

In order to shed light on the relationship between sexual mores and political structure, I will sketch an account of sexuality as a condition for humanity and individual autonomy. I will argue that the individuating power of sexuality, or rather of its social representation and affirmation, derives from its capacity to sever the individual body from the collective body of the group. Through the sexualization of the couple, individual bodies are disentangled from the collective body. Freud noted in the postscript to Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego that the sexual exclusivity of the couple sets it against the group. The social recognition of the couple’s sexuality, in its passionate as well as sensuous instances, allows for the emergence of a private sphere which consolidates individual autonomy and circumscribes public authority.

The Pre-Modern Alternation of Structure and Communitas

Needless to say, the individuating and humanizing power of sexuality did not start to operate with the Enlightenment. It brought into existence pre-modern social and political structures, which were equally premised on the separation between individual and collective bodies and between the private and public realms. The proposed understanding of the individuating power of sexuality derives from an engagement with Victor Turner’s distinction between social structure and communitas. In earlier works, I described communitas as a mode of social existence in which the group forms a single collective body.31 By the notion of the communal body, I refer to the group as an inarticulate, simple unity, immanent and self-identical, that comes into being through the dissolution of interpersonal boundaries. While interaction in social structure takes place between separate individuals and is mediated by their differentiated,
normative social roles, in *communitas* interpersonal boundaries are relaxed. The distinctions between statuses, spheres of life, professions (economic and religious), and other distinctions through which individual identities are defined in social structure, are suspended in *communitas*. The group enacts its unity in a way that leaves no room for plurality and difference.

Missing a notion of the collective social body, Turner could not see that the relation between the individual and the group in *communitas* is a sexual relation, perhaps the most rampant and uninhibited. The enactment of the communal body drains interpersonal relations of the passion and sensuality which sustain them and which now fuel a boundless communal bond. The communal body invades and engulfs the private sphere, leaving no room for competing claims for individual loyalty. The different spheres collapse into a single, all-embracing realm of existence. As an ultimate sexual experience, the enactment of the communal body suspends sexual morality. It relaxes the very distinction between the sexes and multiple sexual prohibitions, including the incest taboo. Together with sexual taboos, other fundamental interdictions are suspended or relaxed. Numerous historical and anthropological accounts of *communitas* record a general breakdown of the normative order. *Communitas* is a moment of legal void through which the normative order can be rejuvenated or reformed. Acting as a single, undivided and omnipotent body, society appropriates the lawless freedom of founding moments and wields constituent power.

With the passage from *communitas* to social structure, individuals reaffirm their separateness from each other and from the collective body. The collective body is projected outside the group in order to make room for individual autonomy. The group renounces thereby its sovereignty and accepts the authority of a law that is superimposed upon it from above, by its projected body. This superimposed law lays down horizontal, interpersonal boundaries and the vertical separation between society, as an aggregation of individuals, and its projected unity. The enjoyment of the communal body during *communitas* gives way to intimate pleasures which draw and bind the individual to the private sphere. The very distinction between private and public spheres is reestablished. Through the recognition of a sexualized private sphere, the law seduces the subject to renounce aspirations for communal presence and for dissolution of boundaries between the different spheres of interaction.

With the refoundation of social structure, it is the passionate rather than the sensuous that emerges as a building-block of the normative order. The
passionate comprises notions of duration and, pitiable, of eternity, which are
premised on the fiction of law’s immortality—the fictional perpetuity of the
corporate body politic—and which are thus unknown in *communitas*. While
the sensuous incarnates the anonymity and transience, or a-temporality, of *communitas*, the passionate binds identifiable members of social structure to
each other and to their own enduring social identities. It consolidates individ-
uation by attaching individuals to the ingredients of their particular identities,
such as personal associations, interests, ideals, and to a normative order that
recognizes the autonomy of the private sphere.

The separation of the individual from the collective body is usually accom-
plished in social structure through the delineation of the private sphere as the
site of a strictly regulated sexuality. The individuating power of sexuality does
not depend, then, on a social recognition of sexual freedom. Under the old
regime, the private sphere was rarely represented as a shelter from positive
morality. The moral freedom of the populated classes was confined to epi-
sodes of *communitas*. And yet, in the darkness of the private sphere, the per-
missible and the prescribed cannot be always distinguished from the pro-
scribed. Both allow individual bodies to affirm their separation from the
collective body and from the public realm. The private sphere had always
combined objective and subjective facets: it is designed by the law while
making room for inscrutable conduct that is oblivious of law and morals.
Under the old regime, moral freedom in the private sphere could not have
been strictly confined to the aristocracy. But only aristocratic libertinism was
politically, if not always officially, representable.

For the same reasons that make regimes which affirm the goodness of nor-
mative sexuality tolerant of deviations from the norm, regimes that chase the
forbidden in sex are inherently aversive to the normative as well. Concern for
individuality compels acceptance of sexual divergence; its repudiation entails
a general distrust of sexuality. The propagation of family values often con-
ceals a general animosity to sexuality, within marriage or without.32 In its
moralistic as well as libertine moments, fascism strove to harness sexuality
to collective ends. Totalitarian regimes were aversive toward the couple
because of its capacity to detract from the libidinal investment of the individ-
ual in the communal bond and hence from the loyalty and devotion of the
individual to collective ends. Such regimes are inherently suspicious of sexu-
ality because it attaches individuals to a private realm which is entirely their
own and which they perceive as good in itself, rather than instrumentally.
The Democratization of Libertinism

While a degree of sexual freedom among the lower classes was not a novelty of Mozart’s time, with Marivaux, Beaumarchais, Da Ponte, Diderot, Mirabeau, and their contemporaries, it became a subject of representation.33 Under the old regime, we have seen, representations of libertinism focused on the aristocracy and on popular episodes of *communitas*. These representations indicated the locus of sovereignty: normally in the hands of the monarchy and the aristocracy, sovereignty was occasionally appropriated by the people. Aristocratic libertinism confirmed the aristocracy’s sovereignty, its liminal position between constituent and constituted power.34 The struggle of the aristocracy to preserve its monopoly over subjective, moral freedom is unraveled in *Figaro*. The sovereign right to subjectivity is exercised by the Count who is simultaneously supreme judge and king of the household and an indefatigable usurper of law and order. The fact that the *ius primae noctis* was a figment of the popular imagination with no real legal grounds, as Alain Boureau has shown,35 does not detract from its significance. Real or imaginary, the lord’s right epitomized the aristocratic monopoly over moral freedom, in the same way that the fabulous imagery surrounding secret services confirms the state’s lawless, sovereign power over life and death.

The democratization of libertinism consists in the integration of hedonist attitudes into the accepted image of all classes. Because sexual freedom is the kernel of subjective freedom generally, because it encapsulates the sovereign lawlessness of *communitas*, the democratization of libertinism implies the universalization of subjective freedom. Libertinism had always ensured a place within structure for the lawlessness of *communitas*, for a pocket of sovereignty that animates the normative order, but now the life of pleasure and moral freedom are prescribed to all layers of society. Concomitantly, belief, vocation, and desire become subjective: they are taken to express individual preferences which are entirely arbitrary from the points of view of tradition and social goals. The unaccountability of an ever-growing realm of personal decision, the sovereignty of the modern subject, is rooted in sexual freedom.

The democratic import of libertinism has been explained in terms of its emphasis on bodily sensations that are blind to class differences.36 However, libertinism fostered equality only once it endowed members of the lower classes with subjectivity and permanent moral freedom. As long as libertine literature focused on the sexual exploits of the aristocracy, it only reproduced class relations, despite the bodily resemblances that were demonstrated
between all members of society. It is the representation of a universal subjectivity centered around sexual license, not the display of corporal similarities, which grounds political equality. The biological or mechanistic arguments of libertinism had little political impact prior to the democratization of hedonistic attitudes.

The democratization of libertinism paved the way to democracy by universalizing subjective freedom and loosening the class structure. Democracy is premised on the dissolution of objective categories of social structure, such as class, status and estate, according to which economic and political powers were distributed under the old regime. Instead, democracy allocates power through competition between abstract and anonymous subjects. As a result, democratic society is characterized by liminal experiences of groundlessness and anonymity.\(^{37}\) Objective identity is impoverished and reduced to the statuses of family membership and abstract citizenship. The view of democracy as rooted in the universalization of libertinism runs against conceptions of freedom prevalent among contemporary theorists of democracy. According to advocates of discursive, or deliberative, democracy, open political deliberation enhances moral autonomy by recognizing each citizen’s capacity for and right to self-determination, and by inducing citizens to ground their claims in reasons that can be reasonably accepted by other citizens. In case deliberation cannot transform citizens, nor reduce disagreement, it should foster freedom at least by assuring reasonable citizens that political decisions are reached with due consideration for the different claims voiced in the public sphere.\(^ {38}\) By contrast, the libertine views democracy as an arena for the playful, competitive expression of subjective freedom, an arena which assumes and cultivates only the subject’s capacity to forge and pursue arbitrary preferences, and in which the moral oblivion of communitas holds sway.\(^ {39}\)

If there is a grain of truth in the libertine understanding of democracy, then processes of democratization may be structurally linked with the explosion of interest in sexuality in the nineteenth century. As Foucault and others have demonstrated, the nineteenth century saw an unprecedented proliferation of ethical, medical, and economic discourses on sexuality.\(^ {40}\) The social vindication of subjective freedom found simultaneous and contradictory expressions in the sentimentalization of bourgeois marriage and in the institutionalization of respectable extra-marital relations and encounters.\(^ {41}\) The image of society as objective structure gave way to a new image—the modern idea of the social—according to which society consists of individual subjectivities
randomly crossing each other while pursuing private gratifications. Traditional institutions were left largely outside this image of society, in favor of new arrangements that were expected to contain and productively coordinate the multitude of private whims and desires by means of rational social engineering. As a result of the dilution and relaxation of traditional social structures, society came to be perceived as beset by an excessive charge of sexuality and permanent disequilibrium. The emerging images of the individual and society in which biology towers over law and tradition fueled the process of democratization.

The democratization of libertinism loosens the dialectics of structure and communitas because it means that moral freedom is no longer confined to popular episodes of communitas. Turner realized that modern social life cannot be conceptualized in terms of an oscillation between structure and communitas. He coined the term liminoid to refer to modern spheres of life, such as art and leisure, in which liminal freedom becomes permanent and structure is constantly called into question. In comparison to the liminal, the liminoid enhances individual autonomy because individual access to moral freedom is no longer dependent upon the rhythm of collective life nor upon class affiliation. As Turner writes: “Liminal phenomena tend to be collective, concerned with calendrical, biological, social-structural rhythms or with crises in social processes... Thus they appear at what may be called ‘natural breaks,’ natural disjunctions in the flow of natural and social processes... Liminal phenomena... are more characteristically individual products.” Turner treated neither modern political freedom nor modern sexual freedom as instances of the liminoid. However, both freedoms valorize arbitrary individual preferences, regularizing licenses that were formerly confined to communitas and to the nobility. Moreover, sexual freedom is the root and prototype of the entire realm of liminoid freedom.

Sexuality and Humaneness

In the passage of sexual license from socially orchestrated interludes of lawlessness to a sphere of permanent unaccountability, society’s perception of sexuality itself is transformed. While the traditional alternation of structure and communitas was predicated on a conception of sexuality as an inhuman menacing power, the emergence of a sphere of permanent subjective freedom implies the humanization of the sensuous. Sexuality became integrated into
the human order and considered an essential expression thereof. Philippe Aries demonstrated that medieval and early modern societies viewed sexuality as akin to death: as a manifestation of the inhuman power of nature—itself a manifestation of more sinister powers—and as nature’s weapon against culture. Society countered the dangers of sex and death through strict moral regulation which, according to Aries, had been relaxed only during holidays and festivals. Through the relaxation of interdictions over violence and sexuality on such occasions, pre-modern society identified temporarily with the inhuman, the other, which was nothing but its own collective body.

When the human order came to be perceived as indestructible by nature, sexuality could be humanized. However intractable, it could be integrated into an order assured of its immortality. The humanizing power of sexuality, its capacity to sever the individual from the collective body, had always been indispensable, but only with modernity was sexuality recognized as a constituent of humanity. Confident of the humanity of sexuality and the goodness of the pursuit of pleasure, Mozart and Da Ponte teach their protagonists that the human and natural orders are one. The libertine valorization of the sensuous gave rise to expansive understandings of subjective freedom and self-determination which loosened the pre-modern dichotomy between culture and nature, structure and communitas, and reshaped political institutions. The advent of subjective freedom reveals itself in the extraordinary subtlety of individuation, of principal and peripheral characters, in the operas of Mozart and Da Ponte. But, as Mozart saw, the libertine account of humaneness is as one-sided as the sentimental. Individuation depends on the affirmation of the sensuous which allows individuals to enjoy liminal anonymity and exercise moral freedom independently of the social rhythm of structure/communitas alternation. It depends even more heavily on lasting relations, with concrete and generalized others, which define and consolidate individual identities.

It is on the issue of naturalism that the foregoing sketch of the changing contours of freedom remains at odds with the outlook of many of Mozart’s contemporaries. Contrary to the naturalist assumptions of enlightened libertinism, weak or strong, and of modern sexual utopists such as Marcuse and Reich, sexual and political freedoms can emerge and prosper only within a legal structure. They are not an outcome of the withering of the law but of legal reform, which renders subjective freedom independent of the social rhythm of structure/communitas oscillation. A return to the state of nature would imply the triumph of the communal body and the death of desire.
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Naturalism may be able to accommodate the view that the humanization of sexuality is the product of a historical process of enlightenment, but it can hardly conceive of desire as irredeemably anchored in the law.

1. The screen is far more hospitable than the stage to judicial presence. For Turner’s views on art as a form of social redress, see Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre (New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982).
5. Pastoral is committed to the view that “the human presence lingers on through the continuation of the natural scene that we have … lived our lives as part of it.” Andrew V. Ettin, Literature and the Pastoral (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 150.
6. Id. at 152.
9. In “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924), Freud revised the account of the pleasure principle given in his earlier essays “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911) and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).
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14. Fiordiligi and Dorabella tell each other of thrilling but vague and indefinable premonitions (Così, scene 4).
15. T. W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (London: Continuum, 2004), 186. Adorno speaks of Mozart’s “capacity to unify the ununifiable by doing justice to what the divergent musical characters require without dissolving it into an obligatory continuum.” Id., 389.
16. According to Allanbrook, Figaro unfolds in “a place out of time, where Eros presides” and “the very unreality of Mozart’s pastoral place is a guarantee of its possibility. It is merely a state of mind, called into being by a tacit understanding and defined by a nostalgic and otherworldly musical gesture.” See Allanbrook, supra note 4 at 131, 156, 173.
18. Nor are the principles of the patriarchal order the expression of aggression and destructiveness, or the product of a transformative domestication of such forces, as law appears in the light of psychoanalysis.
20. As Irving Singer writes of Così: “[I]t is often the conflict between the sensuous and the passionate that structures the music.” Irving Singer, Mozart and Beethoven: The Concept of Love in Their Operas (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 91. According to Jessica Waldoff, the heroines’ love for the Albanian gentlemen is as sincere as their love for the soldiers. While Singer speaks of a conflict between the sensuous and the passionate—convincingly in my view—for Waldoff the opera revolves around a conflict between two sentimental attachments. See Recognition in Mozart’s Operas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 188, 228. Singer’s interpretation of Figaro as an outright libertine celebration of the sensuous is less convincing.
25. “[L]a mort de don Juan ne s’ouvre pas sur l’au-delà: la Statue n’est pas l’âme du Commandeur, mais son phantasme; elle n’est pas déléguée par les victimes ou par Dieu pour exercer la vengeance, elle est l’obstacle fatal à quoi se hurte la démesure du triste héros.” Jean Victor Hoquard, La pensée de Mozart (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 439. As a two-dimensional figure, Don Giovanni is according to Hoquard not even capable of moral responsibility: “don Juan pour Mozart ... n’est pas vraiment le débauché, mais l’homme qui ne se refuse aucun des plaisirs de la terre. . . . Il est l’homme pour qui le surnaturel (non seulement Dieu, mais le monde mystérieux des âmes) ne compte pas. Incroyant? Même pas, et encore moins esprit fort: il ne profane pas le cimetière avec la joie satanique du sacrilège. Il n’a pas mauvaise conscience, parce que il n’a pas de conscience du tout. Et pas davantage le sens du péché, car il ne se sent pas de règles, mais seulement des obstacles à renverser. . . . C’est une âme presque claire, nous allions dire: pure! Sans retour sur soi, il va de l’avant, toujours haletant, toujours tendu vers la conquête future.” Id., 433–34.
28. In Molière, Don Juan praises liberty in love ("J’aime la liberté en amour") before encountering the statue of the Commendatore.


34. The monarch and the high nobility were simultaneously subject and superior to the law, simultaneously within and without social structure, embodying the mythical, extra-social source of law and political legitimacy. In his account of Roman imperial authority, Paul Veyne associates the subjective right (droit subjectif) of the Emperor with sovereign divinity and complete unaccountability. See Le pain et le cirque (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 542, 553. In a recent essay, Veyne modified his earlier account of imperial authority. See “Qu’était-ce qu’un empereur romain?” in Veyne, L’empire Gréco-romain (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 15–78.


36. Lynn Hunt has argued that a call for equality is implicit in the pornographic concentration on the exposed body. “If all bodies were interchangeable—a dominant trope in pornographic writing—then social and gender (and perhaps even racial) differences would effectively lose their meaning.” See Lynn Hunt, ed., The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500–1800 (Cambridge: Zone Books, 1995), 44. Later she refers to the “leveling effects of bodily desires.” Id., 334. Margaret Jacob, in her contribution to Hunt’s captivating volume, locates the political relevance of pornography in its materialist assumptions, which assign the highest authority to nature rather than established institutions. See id., Margaret C. Jacob, “The Materialist World of Pornography,” 157–203.

37. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel described democracy in terms of disintegration of structural categories: “Taken without its monarch and the articulation of the whole which is the indispensable and direct concomitant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer a state. It lacks every one of those determinate characteristics—sovereignty, government, judges, magistrates, class-divisions, &c.,—which are to be found only in a whole which is inwardly organized.” Addition to paragraph 279, T. M. Knox, Hegel’s Philosophy of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), 183.


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on the intellectual history of pornography, Margaret Jacob suggested that participants in the urban, literate circles of the eighteenth century were originally brought together by an interest in exploring human sexuality in general and their own in particular. Thus, even if the democratic arena should be conceived in terms of a public sphere of rational discourse, and not as a political market, its origins may lie in the valorization and democratization of the life of pleasure. See Margaret C. Jacob, “The Materialist World of Pornography” in Lynn Hunt, ed., The Invention of Pornography (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 1993), 191.


45. In the fragment cited above, supra note 29, Adorno seems to imply that sexuality had been humanized before the Enlightenment, and that the Enlightenment consisted in the universalization of humaneness through the democratization of libertinism. It may be the case, contrary to Adorno’s suggestion, that libertinism had to be democratized as soon as it became synonymous with humanity and that its humanization and democratization were coterminous.
